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Abstract 
We use formal semantic analysis based on new constructions to study abstract realizability, 
introduced by Ltiuchli in 1970, and expose its algebraic content. We claim realizability so con- 
ceived generates semantics-based intuitive confidence that the Heyting Calculus is an appropriate 
system of deduction for constructive reasoning. 
Well-known semantic formalisms have been defined by Kripke and Beth, but these have no 
formal concepts corresponding to constructions, and shed little intuitive light on the meanings of 
formulae. In particular, the completeness proofs for these semantics do not generate confidence in 
the sufficiency of the Heyting Calculus, since we have no reason to believe that every intuitively 
constructive truth is valid in the formal semantics. 
Lguchli has proved completeness for a realizability semantics with formal concepts analogous 
to constructions. We argue in some detail that, in spite of a certain inherent inexactness of 
the analogy, every intuitively constructive truth is valid in Liiuchli semantics, and therefore the 
Heyting Calculus is powerful enough to prove all constructive truths. Our argument is based 
on the postulate that a uniformly constructible object must be communicable in spite of impre- 
cision in our language, and that the permutations in Liiuchli’s semantics represent conceivable 
imprecision in a language, while allowing a certain amount of freedom in choosing the particular 
structure of the language. 
We give a detailed generalization of Liiuchli’s proof of completeness for the propositional part 
of the Heyting Calculus, in order to make explicit constructive and algebraic content. 
In our treatment, we establish several new results about Liuchli models. We show how to 
extend the stoning and gluing constructions familiar from Kripke and Frame semantics and 
Topos theory, to Ltiuchli models, and use them to give an algebraic approach to countermodel 
construction. In particular, the Liiuchli arguments are given without the restriction to the integers, 
Z, as a group of permutations, which makes much of the coding scheme used in Lguchli’s original 
paper transparent. 
We also make use of a new propositions-as-types yntax for the Heyting calculus, with limited 
nondeterminism, in which validity of formulae can be decided without loop-detection. 
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1. A philosophical Introduction 
This paper presents a semantic analysis of constructive reasoning that formalizes 
a set of explicit intuitions about constructions. We use that analysis to demonstrate 
that the usual formal systems for constructive propositional logic (the Heyting Propo- 
sitional Calculus [ 131 and equivalent formal systems) have precisely the right power 
for constructive reasoning. Kripke semantics already provides a technically very suc- 
cessful semantic analysis of constructive logic, with formal soundness and complete- 
ness proofs. We argue that these proofs do not justify a claim that a formal logical 
system is the right one for constructive reasoning, because Kripke’s semantics are 
not formally based on the intuitions of constructive reasoning. Our approach, based 
on the realizability semantics of Kleene and Liiuchli, formalizes the concept of a 
construction directly, so our soundness and completeness proofs yield genuine evi- 
dence that the formal rules of constructive logic precisely capture constructive reason- 
ing. 
Logical systems are ultimately based on philosophical positions. In particular, clas- 
sical logic is based on the position that every meaningful assertion is definitely either 
true or false, Of course, we may not know the truth or falsehood of a given assertion 
a, but we may use in reasoning the fact that one or the other must hold. In contrast, 
constructive philosophy holds that an assertion is true only if a mental construction 
proves its correctness, and is false only if there is a mental construction of an absurdity 
from it. This more stringent concept of truth leads to a more conservative logic, with 
fewer theorems. For example, the classical law of the excluded middle (a V x) is not 
constructively valid. An a priori argument for this is that there may be formulae 01 
such that neither M nor 1~1 is proved by a construction. Constructive philosophy allows 
the possibility that there are formulae that are neither true nor false. 
While negation displays the disagreement between constructive and classical logic 
in the most transparent way, there are also purely positive formulae on which the 
logics disagree. For example, c( V (a =?- /?) is classically, but not constructively, valid. 
Excluded middle is just the special case where p denotes a patent falsehood. The 
constructive fallacy in arguments for this assertion is discussed in Section 2. If the 
only available connective is implication, we may still distinguish the logics by Peirce’s 
law [29], (((a + p) + a) + tl), which is classically, but not constructively, valid. In 
all of these cases, constructive logic rejects the validity of the assertion in question, 
but does not affirm its negation. 
An intriguing perspective on constructive reasoning is advanced by GGdel’s double- 
negation translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic. Since, in classical logic, 
the connectives V and + are eliminable in favor of conjunction and negation, we may 
view propositions containing these connectives as abbreviations for their equivalent 
A, l-forms and take the position that disjunction and implication simply don’t occur 
in classical logic at all. Then constructive reasoning can be viewed as an extension 
of classical reasoning by two genuinely new connectives. For details about the formal 
properties of this translation and related ones the reader may consult [37]. 
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A consequence of this translation and its properties is that if a classical proof of 
falsity exists in pure predicate logic then so does a constructive proof Thus one cannot 
hope to make a case in favor of constructive reasoning by establishing the inconsistency 
of classical logic. 
For each philosophical position about truth and falsehood, it is useful to design 
languages for expressing assertions, to discover appropriate systems of reasoning, and 
even to define these languages and reasoning systems formally. An appropriate system 
of reasoning must be faithful to its underlying philosophy - that is, every logical con- 
sequence derived by the system must be philosophically correct. Given faithfulness, it 
is desirable that a system of reasoning be as powerful as possible. Ideally, it should be 
fuZZ - that is, every logical consequence, expressible in the language, that follows from 
the philosophy should be derivable in the system. Well-designed systems of reason- 
ing may often be seen to be faithful by direct intuitive inspection. Demonstrations of 
fullness are usually much more subtle and complex, requiring substantial mathematical 
tools. So, to show that a system is full, we need a formal description of the semantics 
of the language, capturing the crucial qualities of the philosophical position underlying 
the system of reasoning. A formal description also improves our understanding of faith- 
fulness, even though faithfulness may be demonstrated more directly and intuitively. 
Feferman has defined related concepts of faithfulness and adequacy [5, 11. His concept 
of faithfulness is essentially the same as ours, but adequacy requires that the language 
be powerful enough to express the important properties of a system, while our fullness 
requires only that the true formulae in a given language be provable. 
A mathematical semantic system typically identifies a class of structures, called 
worlds or models, representing the possible world states that logical assertions are 
intended to describe. In addition, a formal description of semantics must define the 
conditions under which a given assertion is true of a given model. The act of infer- 
ring a conclusion /I as a logical consequence of assumption c( is valid if /? is true in 
every model in which CY is true. A formal system for reasoning is sound with respect 
to a semantic system if every logical consequence derivable in the system is valid; it 
is complete if every valid logical consequence can be derived. Soundness is a formal 
analogue of faithfulness, and completeness is a formal analogue of fullness. The formal 
versions have the advantage that they are susceptible to mathematical proof. In order to 
use mathematical proofs of soundness and completeness to provide evidence for faith- 
fulness and fullness, we must analyze the relationship between the formal semantics 
and the philosophy behind it. In particular, soundness implies faithfulness if validity in 
the formal semantics implies philosophica correctness. Similarly, compieteness implies 
fullness if philosophical correctness implies formal validity, 
The formal mathematical treatment of semantics for classical propositional logic is 
an intuitively direct formalization of its philosophy. The philosophy holds that every 
formula is either true or false, and that the truth or falsehood of a composite for- 
mula depends only on the truth or falsehood of its components. So, a formal model 
simply assigns truth or falsehood to each atomic assertion. It is intuitively clear that 
every conceivable reality is represented by a model, and that every model represents 
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a conceivable reality, so the well-known soundness and completeness proofs for clas- 
sical logic provide completely satisfactory demonstrations of faithfulness and fullness. 
In particular, the proof of completeness provides us with a truth-table countermodel 
for each unprovable formula cq and that countermodel yields a completely concrete 
interpretation of the atomic formulae under which CI is clearly and intuitively false. For 
example, (a + /I) + (/I + a) is not provable in classical ogic. The countermodel is
given by the truth table in Fig. 1. If we interpret CI as the proposition 
in the diagram of Fig. I, the symbol “a” appears in the same row with the symbol “F”, 
and /3 as the proposition 
in the diagram of Fig. I, the symbol “p appears in the same row with the symbol “T”, 
it is intuitively clear that u + /3 is true, but /3 +- LX is false. 
The situation with respect o constructive logic is less satisfactory. There are well- 
known proof systems that can easily be seen by intuitive inspection to be faithful. These 
proof systems are known to be sound and complete with respect o the semantics of 
Kripke [ 191 and Beth [2]. The models of Kripke semantics consist of partially ordered 
collections of possible worlds, each of which has the form of a classical model in 
that it accepts or rejects every atomic assertion. Intuitively, however, acceptance of 
an assertion in a possible world is intended as an indication that the assertion is not 
just classically true, but knowable in that world, while rejection indicates only that 
the assertion is not knowable, not that its negation is knowable. So, each possible 
world represents a conceivable state of knowledge. World D preceding world tn in the 
partial ordering of a model is intended to indicate that it is possible that the state of 
knowledge represented by n will develop into that represented by tn over time. 
Kripke semantics eems to formalize a certain temporal-epistemic philosophy of truth 
directly. If we take the position that an assertion is known precisely when we have 
a mental construction proving it, then a Kripke model may be read as describing a 
postulated temporal development of the collection of constructions that we possess. Be- 
cause there is no immediately apparent way to extract a construction from an arbitrary 
Kripke model, however, we have no a priori reason to believe that every Kripke model 
represents a conceivable constructive reality. The mere fact that standard intuitionis- 
tic propositional proof systems are complete with respect o Kripke models does not 
clearly imply that they are full with respect o the philosophy of constructivism. The 
extensional correspondence b tween validity for Kripke models and formal provability 
might in some sense only be a coincidence, which may be very useful as a technical 
Fig. 1. Classical truth-table countermodel for (a + /3) +- (p + a). 
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device, but which cannot be taken as an intuitive justification for the formal rules of 
proof. 
In order to develop intuitively satisfactory mathematical semantics for constructive 
logic, we should find direct formal representatives for constructions, and define for- 
mally what it means for a construction to prove an assertion. Heyting spelled out 
an informal blueprint indicating what such a formal definition might entail in the so- 
called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation [37]. It is sketched out in 
Definition 4.1 While such an interpretation does not pin down the meaning of the 
connectives, and indeed does not even rule out a classical interpretation, it has led to 
several interpretations based directly on the notion of a construction, in particular the 
so-called Curry-Howard interpretation, and the one that constitutes the main theme of 
this paper. 
Kleene [ 15-171 also proposed a BHK-style semantics, called realizability semantics, 
in which constructions are represented by set-theoretic objects, called realizers, of 
appropriate types - particularly, a realizer proving 0: +- p is a function from realizers 
for CI to realizers for p. An object realizing a formula is the formal analogue to a 
construction proving an assertion. There are fundamental reasons to doubt the possibility 
of defining in any precise and effective way the class of constructions. To establish 
faithfulness through a mathematical proof of soundness, it is important o identify 
a class of realizers that clearly represent constructions. To establish fullness through 
a proof of completeness, we must find a class of realizers that clearly includes a 
representative for each possible construction. There is no need to find a single class of 
realizers corresponding precisely to constructions. 
Kleene’s realizability semantics allows the partial computable fnnctions to act as 
realizers representing constructions. It is intuitively clear that every construction is 
computable, but Rose showed that the formula 
((1-7 * Y) ==+ (7-y v ‘Y)) =+ (117 v ‘Y) 
where 
is true in Kleene’s semantics, but not provable in Heyting Calculus [31], so Heyting 
Calculus is not complete for Kleene’s realizability. Liiuchli achieved the first com- 
pleteness result for formal constructive reasoning (in the first-order predicate calculus) 
with respect o a realizability semantics [22], by allowing as realizers only functions 
that are invariant under certain permutations. We believe that Ltiuchli’s analysis has 
the essential technical form required for a genuine demonstration of Illness, but two 
important components are lacking. First, Liiuchli does not explain the intuitive connec- 
tion between permutation i variance and constructions. Second, he proves completeness 
only of the theorems of formal constructive logic - the formulae that can be proved 
with no assumptions - while we want completeness of the logical consequence r la- 
tion. Friedman proved another ealizability completeness result (unpublished), using a 
simpler technical basis than Liiuchli’s, but not addressing any of the points above. 
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In this paper, we work out an intuitive basis for Lliuchli’s realizability semantics, 
showing how it can be derived from intuitions about the unambiguous communicabil- 
ity of a function in spite of certain ambiguities of language. Based on this intuitive 
explanation of Lauchli’s semantics, we argue that completeness with respect o such 
formal semantics does in fact imply fullness with respect o a coherent philosophical 
position. We do not argue that the philosophical position identified here is correct, 
nor even that it is held by any particular constructivist or intuitionist, but only that 
it is a plausible position for which the Heyting calculus is an appropriate formal sys- 
tem. 
We also underscore the crucial model-theoretic constructions involved in the proof of 
completeness, and extend Ltiuchli’s proof to logical consequences in the propositional 
calculus, in addition to theorems (the argument for fullness for logical consequences 
depends on the intuitive form of the deduction rule). Finally, we examine the con- 
structive content of the completeness proof. For the propositional calculus, the proof is 
completely constructive, but it depends on the decidability of validity in that language, 
and the sufficiency ofJinite countermodels for invalid formulae. In the predicate calcu- 
lus, the definition of a countermodel for an invalid formula is completely constructive, 
but the proof that it is a countermodel requires the axiom of choice. 
We assume familiarity with constructive formalism, but not necesarily with the spe- 
cific systems used here. This paper is not intended to provide an introduction to the 
systems, nor on various intuitive philosophical bases for logics, but rather to illuminate 
connections between the two for a reader who already understands each in isolation. We 
repeat well-known and sometimes elementary details of formal definitions and proofs 
whenever we find them helpful to focus attention on their connection to the intuition 
we are seeking to highlight, or on special details of our completeness proof. 
2. Positive constructive propositional logic 
2.1. A formal notation for propositional formulae 
In our study we restrict attention to the language of positive propositional logic 
because the most important semantic issues have to do with implication. Negation in- 
troduces complications that are technically easy to solve, but that obscure the essential 
insights. From now on, all references to propositional formulae, proofs, etc. are un- 
derstood to be positive unless otherwise stated. The set of propositional formulae is 
denoted PF. 
For convenience, we introduce several abbreviations into our printed notation. We 
systematically drop parentheses, giving precedence to A, V, and + in that order. The 
symbols A, V, and + associate to the right, so u + p G- y is an abbreviation for 
(a =+ (/I =s- y)). In the case of A and V, the direction of association does not mat- 
ter semantically in either classical or constructive logic, but the association of + is 
significant in both logics. 
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2.2. A formal notation for constructive propositional proofs 
Proofs are the formal analogues of rigorously reasoned arguments. Formal descrip- 
tions of proofs are often treated as mere syntactic devices for enumerating true for- 
mulae. In constructive logic, we can get a deeper insight into proofs by regarding a 
proof formula as a syntactic object denoting a semantic construction. So proof formu- 
lae, as well as propositional formulae, have semantic content. The following notation 
for proofs is technically equivalent to the natural deduction notation of Fitch [6], but 
uses lambda-terms [9, 141 to exhibit the intended interpretation of a proof as denoting 
a construction, more directly and naturally than Fitch’s notation. We use r k a : M. 
to mean that a is a proof formula proving the propositional formula CC, possibly using 
assumptions in the collection r of labelled formulae, but no others. For notational 
simplicity, set braces are omitted in collections of assumptions, and commas are used 
for unions (so x : a, r I- b : j3 abbreviates {X : a} U r k b : /?). 
Definition 2.1. Assume that there is an unlimited supply of labels for assumptions. 
The (deterministic) proof formulae are defined inductively as follows: 
(B) If x is a label, then x : a k x : CI for all formulae a; 
(AI) If r t a : a and A k b : fl, 
then r, A I- (a, b) : (LX A p); 
(/\E) If r I- c : (LX A /I), then r I- (QC) : LX, and r k (~lc) : p; 
(VI) If r t- a : a, then r I- (0,a) : (a V /3), and r k (1,a) : (fl v a); 
(VE) If r I- c : (a V /I), A t d : (a j. y), and 0 t e : (p =s- y), 
then r, A, 0 t (Xcde) : y; 
(+I) If x : a, r F b : b and r does not contain an assumption with label X, then 
r k (;lx : GI . b) : (a + p); 
(+E) Ifrl-a:a,andAl-b:(a+/3),thenT,Ak(ba):p; 
(K) If r I- a : a, then r, A F a : CC. 
The notions of subformulae of proof formulae, and free and bound occurrences of 
labelled assumptions within proof formulae, are defined in the usual manner [35]. 
Like propositional formulae, proof formulae are not character strings, but abstract 
formal objects constructed from labels and various proof operators denoted by (., .), 
(a0 *), (01 -), (0,.), (L.)? (x . . .), (1 . : a . .), and (. e). Parentheses are omit- 
ted in notations for proof formulae when no ambiguity results. Function applications 
associate to the left, so that xyz abbreviates ((xJJ)z). Notice that most of the rules 
for constructing proof formulae in Definition 2.1 come in the form (@I), or (OE), 
where @ is one of the operators A, V, or +. The (01) rule is the introduction rule 
for 0, since it shows how to introduce 0 into the head position of a formula in a 
proof. The (OE) rule is the elimination rule for 0, because it shows how to eliminate 
0 as head symbol in a formula, in order to reason about its principal subformu- 
lae. The only exceptions to this structure are the basis rule (B) and the weakening 
rule (K). 
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Intuitively, (a, b) denotes the ordered pair of a and b, and a0 and at denote the 
associated selection functions. The proof formula (0,a) marks a as a construction for 
the left-hand side of a disjunction, (1,a) for the right. The proof operator x denotes 
a conditional function, such that (X(O,c)de) = (dc) and (X(l,c)de) = (ec). In the 
terminology of the lambda-calculus, the label x on an assumption a is a variable of 
type a. The proof formula (,4.x : a . b) denotes the function that, given a construction 
for u, assigns that construction as the value of n and returns the resulting value of b. 
Notice that x can be variously thought of as a label on an assumption, or as a variable, 
with no inconsistency. The proof operation (ba) denotes the application of the function 
b to argument a. 
In the discussions that follow, we will abbreviate xpressions of the form r I- a : o! 
in several ways. 
Definition 2.2. a~, . . . , a, k bo : PO,. . . , b, : bn if and only if there exist labels x0,. . . ,x, 
such that x0 : as ,..., x, : a, k bo : j?o ,..., b, : /$. 
r k c1 if and only if there exists a proof formula a such that r k a : a. In this case, 
we say there is a constructive deduction from r to a. 
t a : a if and only if 0 t a : a. 
I- a if and only if 0 k ct. In this case, we say that a is a constructive theorem. 
A constructive proof formula as defined in Definition 2.1 above may be read straight- 
forwardly as a natural deduction proof. In particular, function application corresponds 
precisely to modus ponens: if r k b : (a +- p) and A I- a : a, then the proof (ba) 
of B from assumptions in r, A may be rewritten as in Fig. 2. Lambda abstraction 
corresponds to the deduction rule: if x : a,I’ t- b : /I?, then the proof (Ax : c( . b) of 
a + /3 from assumptions in r may be rewritten as in Fig. 3. The main peculiarity of 
the lambda notation is that it distinguishes different assumptions x : a and y : u of the 
same formula a. Such a distinction is superfluous for the purpose of deriving theorems, 
Assume r, A 
. ..b... (a proof of a + B from r) 
a=+P 
. ..a... (a proof of a from A) 
;, by modus ponens 
Fig. 2. Natural deduction proof corresponding to (ba). 
Assume r 
Assume TV 
. . . b.. . (a proof of p from a, r) 
P 
fX =+ P, by the deduction rule 
Fig. 3. Natural deduction proof corresponding to (Lx : a b). 
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but it is certainly not harmful, and it leads to a unique association of a function with 
each proof of an implication. 
Pairing corresponds to introducing c( A p after proving c( and fl individually, and 
selection corresponds to detaching conjuncts. Marking a proof with 0 or 1 corresponds 
to introducing a disjunction after proving one of the disjuncts, and the conditional 
operator x corresponds to proof by cases. 
The proof formulae of Definition 2.1 were designed to represent as simply as is pos- 
sible the structure of logical arguments and the structure of constructions of functions. 
In order to analyze the concept of proof formally, we consider a variant, called non- 
deterministic proof formulae, in which conditional forms (Xabc) (i.e., proofs by cases) 
are decomposed into a two-level form, where the inner level associates a conditional- 
branch/case with the condition in which it is used, and the outer level combines the 
branches. Nondeterministic proof formulae denote partial proofs that are contingent 
upon the selection of certain branches of disjunctions. To accommodate such contin- 
gency, the relation 1 is extended to allow collections of proof-formula : formula pairs 
on the right-hand side, resulting in the form xc : ao,. . .,x, : u, I- b. : PO,. . . , b, : j&. 
The intended meaning of this form is that, whenever each of the xis is replaced by 
a proof of the corresponding Ui, then at least one of the bj’s denotes a constructive 
proof of the corresponding pi. Note that the choice of bi may depend on the particular 
proofs substituted for x0, . . . , x, . 
Definition 2.3. As in Definition 2.1, assume an unlimited supply of labels for assump- 
tions. The nondeterministic proof formulae are defined inductively as follows: 
(IS) If x is a label, then x : a t x : a for all formulae a; 
(nA1) If~~a::,@andAt-b:/?,Y,thenr,AF(a,b):(ccA/Q@,Y; 
(nAE) If r F c : (a A /IQ@, then r F (QC) : a, Qi, and r t- (arc) : j, @; 
(nV1) If r F a : cc, @, then r F (0,a) : (a V /?), @, and r t (1,~) : (j3 v a), CD; 
(nVE) If r l- c : (CI v p),@, then r F (pot) : tx,(plc): fi,@; 
(nN) If r F a0 : a,al : a, Qi, then r t- [ao,al], : a, @; 
(n+I) If x : cr,T k b : j3, and r does not contain an assumption with label x, then 
r 1 (kc : a . b) : (M * p); 
(n=+-E) If r F c : (a =s b), @, and A k a : LX, Y, then r, A I- (ca) : j?, @, Y; 
(nK) Ifrt-@,thenr,AF@,Y. 
In principle, the subscript a in [., .I& is required to avoid ambiguity in nondeterministic 
proof formulae, but we omit it when it is clear from the context. 
Notice that most of the rules in Definition 2.3 allow the same constructions as in 
Definition 2.1, with arbitrary additional proof-formula : formula pairs on the right-hand 
side. The rule (n+I) for introducing an implication sign is an exception, and it allows 
only one pair on the right-hand side. It is tempting to generalize this rule to allow 
additional pairs, just like the others: 
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[(n+IC)] If x : u, r I- b : j?, CD, and r does not contain an assumption with label x, 
then 
Such a generalization is sound for classical ogic, but not for constructive logic, as 
it allows the fallacious derivation of the law CI V (a =% /?) shown in Fig. 4. From 
this constructively fallacious formula, all classically true formulae may be derived con- 
structively. Notice how the label/variable x is used as an undischarged assumption in 
(0,x), and inconsistently as if it had two different ypes (i.e., as if it labelled the two 
different formulae tl and fi) within (1, (Ax : CI . x)). The basic idea of nondeterministic 
proof as embodied in (nD) allows the type-inconsistent usage in the second contin- 
gent proof in line (2), because the first contingent proof is type-consistent. Then, the 
generalized implication introduction rule (n=+-IC) allows the type-consistent use of the 
assumption x in the first contingent proof in line (2) to remain undischarged, because 
the type-inconsistent use in the second contingent proof was discharged. Thus, each 
contingent proof does one thing right, and one thing wrong, and the rules (nV1) and 
(nN) allow them to be combined and treated as correct. It is intuitively clear that 
[ (0, x), (1, (Ax : a . x))] does not denote a sensible assumption-free construction ’ for 
CI V (tl =$ 8). Notice that we have not demonstrated that CI V (a + B) is constructively 
invalid, but merely that the obvious argument in its favor is constructively invalid. In 
fact, a V (a + fi) is not derivable by the rules of Definition 2.3, but we will not be 
able to demonstrate his until we have developed constructive semantics. 
Another tempting eneralization of (n+I) is 
(n + ICW) Ifx : cr,r k bo : PO,..., b, : B,,, and r does not contain an assumption 
with label x, then 
r t- (2.x : ct . bo) : (a =s PO),. . .,(h : CI . b,) : (CI =+ /Y?n). 
The constructive fallacy in (n + ICW) is a bit more subtle. It allows the abbreviated 
proof of (a + p) V (p =+ ct) shown in Fig. 5. This formula constructively implies 
(a + p) v ((a =s /?) + a), but not all classically valid formulae are proved, and 
the logic of (n+ICW) is intermediate between classical and constructive logic. The 
fallacious step is line (3). Notice that in line (2) a single object U, assumed to prove 
(a v B), was guaranteed to provide either a proof (pau) of a or a proof (pru) of /I. 
In line (3), u was abstracted separately from each of (pou) and (pru), so in effect 
there are two difSerent u’s in line (3), each assumed to prove M V /?. There is no 
way to guarantee that either the first proves CI or the second proves B, since it is quite 
possible that the first proves p and the second proves GI. So, line (3) does not intuitively 
represent a pair of constructions at least one of which must be correct, and therefore 
does not fulfill the intent of the nondeterministic proof formulae. The remaining steps 
merely work the fallacy of line (3) into the form (a + /I) V (j3 + a). 
’ We might try to blame the rule (IX) instead of (n =+ IC), but a slightly longer version of the proof uses 
(n V E) instead of (nK). 
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1. x:cckx:u 
2. x:akx:u,x:~ 
3. l-x : cI,(A.x : a . x) : (cl * p) 
4. k (0,x) : (a v (c( =+ /I)), 
(Lx : CI . x): (Lx * j?) 
5. t- (0,x) : (tl v (a * j)), 
(l,(k.x : a . x)) : (a v (a =+ fl)) 
6. t [(0,x), (l,+ : a . x))] : (CI v (a =s b)) 
Fig. 4. Constructively fallacious argument for G( V (a =k j3). 
(t-J3). 
1, (nK). 
2, (n * IC). 
3, (n V I). 
4, (n VI). 
5, W). 
Intuitively, pc and pi are intended to denote contingent (i.e., partial, in the termi- 
nology of recursion theory) operators uch that (po (0, a)) = a, (pl(1, b) ) = b, and 
@cc), @id) do not denote proofs when c and d are not of the forms (0,a) and (l,b), 
respectively. The proof operator [., .I@ denotes a contingent nondeterministic operator 
such that [a, bla = a if a denotes a proof of c( but b does not, [a, bla = b in the opposite 
case, [a, bla is nondeterministically either of a and b when both denote proofs of a, 
and finally [a, b]@ does not denote a proof of a if neither of a, b does so. The usual 
conditional-form deterministic proof formula (Xabc) proving y is represented by the 
nondeterministic proof formula [(b(poa)), (c(pl a))]?. Nondeterministic proof formulae 
in which [.;I@, (PO.), and (pi.) appear in other forms than the preceding one do not 
translate directly into deterministic proof formulae, but it is easy to show that this does 
not change the essential power of the system. 
Theorem 2.4. There exists a collection of nondeterministic proof formulae, a:d,. . . , aid 
such that r k agd : ao,...,aid : a,, if and only if there exists a deterministic proof 
formula ad such that r k ad : (UO V . . . V a,,). 
1. u : (a v p> k 24 : (a v 8) (W. 
2. u : (a v 8) k (pou) : cr,(plu) : p 1, (nVE). 
3. k (Au : (a V /I) . (~024)) : ((a V /?) * a), 
(Au : (a V PI . (P~u)) : (CM V B) +- 8) 2, (n*ICW). 
For brevity, let a denote the first proof formula in line (3), and let b denote the second. 
Let c and d be proof formulae for the easily derived constructive tautologies of lines 
(4) and (5) below: 
4. k c : ((a v j?) * cc) * (/I =+ rf) 
5. I- d : ((a v fl) =s /I) + (LX + /?) 
Using these abbreviations, we continue: 
6. t (ca) : (/I + a), 
(db) : (a =s B) 3, 4 (n+E); 3, 5 (n+E) 
7. k (l,(ca)) : (a =+ B> V (P =k u>, 
(0, (db)) : (a * B) V (I+ Co 6, (nV1) twice 
8. !- [(l,(ca)), (O,(db))l : (a * PI V (B * a) 7, (nN) 
Fig. 5. Constructively fallacious argument for (a + 8) V (/I + a). 
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To prove Theorem 2.4, we need a few lemmata. 
Lemma 2.5. Let a~,. . . , a,,, and /IO,. . . ,/I,, be two sequences of formulae, such that 
(a0,. . . , a,)G{P0,..., fin} Let ad be a deterministic proof formula such that r k ad : 
(a0 v ... V a,). Then, there is a deterministic proof formula bd such that T k bd : 
(PoV..*VPn>. 
Proof. A straightforward generalization of the following example. We can derive 
(B V y V a) from (a V /?). We begin by deriving a + (fi V y V a): 
1. u:at-u:a (B) 
2. tr : a k (1, Y) : (y V a) 1, (VI) 
3. u:at-(l,(l,v)):(/?VyVa) 3, (VU 
4. I-(Iv:a. (l,(l,u)))a*(/?V~Va) 3, (* I) 
Similarly, we can derive fi + (fi V y V a). 
5. k (Aw : /3 . (0, (0, w))) : j3 * (p V y V a) 
Finally, we collect the results of the separate derivations using (vE) 
6. u:(aVtY)I-u:(aVP) (B) 
7. u:aVj3~(~u(ilv:a. (l,(l,u)))(Jw:p. (O,(O,w)))): 4, 5, 6 (VE) 
C/J V Y V a) 
This completes the proof. q 
Lemma 2.6. If ad is a deterministic proof formula such that r I- ad : a, then there is 
a nondeterministic proof formula and such that r I- and : a. 
Proof. The Lemma follows by an easy induction on the construction of ad. Every 
clause in the definition of deterministic proof formulae is replicated in the definition 
of nondeterministic proof formulae, except (VE), which constructs conditional proofs. 
Assume that r k bd : (a V /.?), A I- cd : (a + y), and 0 k dd : (fi + y). It suffices to 
show that there is a nondeterministic proof formula end such that r, A, 0 t- end : y. 
By our inductive assumption, there are nondeterministic proof formulae bnd, end, and 
dnd such that 
1. rkbnd:(aVj?) 
2. A F end : (a + y) 
3. 0 I- dnd : (fl =s y) 
Our construction of end continues as follows: 
4. r k (pobnd) : a, 
(olbnd) : B 
5. r, A, 0 k (c”d(p#d)) : y, 
(dnd(olb”d)) : Y 
6. r, A, 0 I- [(cnd(pob”d)), (dnd(p, b”d))] : y 
This completes the proof. q 
3, WE) 
2, 4, (n-W 
3, 4, 0-W 
5, W) 
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Proof of Theorem 2.4. (e=) Assume that r t- ad : (a0 V . . . V cc,). By Lemma 2.6, 
there is a nondeterministic proof formula and such that r I- and : (~0 V . . . V a,). 
We now obtain aid,. . . , aid such that r k azd : ~10,. . , aid : a, by repeated application 
of (nVE). 
(+) The proof proceeds 
cro,...,a$ : Lx,. 
Basis: Straightforward. 
Induction: The induction 
by induction on the length of the derivation r k azd : 
step proceeds by cases according to the last step in the 
derivation. We do the (n A I) case for example, the others are closely analogous. 
(n A I) Assume that the last step in deriving r t aid : a~, . . . , aid : ct, uses (n A I). 
We may assume without loss of generality that (n A I) is used to create the aIfd : ~10 
term (the right-hand side of the nondeterministic form represents a set, so order is 
insignificant, and Lemma 2.5 allows us to reorder the disjuncts in the deterministic 
form at will). So, the derivation has the form: 
i. rFb”d:j?,a;d:u, ,..., azd:cr,, 
j. r k end :y,ayd : q ,..., aid : u, 
k. ~~(b”d,c”d):(/?A\),a;d:cri ,..., u;~:cI, i, j, (nAI) 
where ut;” = (bnd,cnd) and a,, = /I A y. Notice that by (nK), we may assume that the 
uyd : Q’S for i # 0 and the elements of r are all present in lines (i) and (j). By our 
inductive hypothesis, there are deterministic proof formulae bd and cd such that 
1. rkbd:(pVaov-4a,) 
2. r t cd : cy v ~1~ v . . . v 0l,) 
As in Lemma 2.5, there must be a dd for the easily provable tautology: 
3. ~dd:(BVcloV...Vcr,)~(yVcroV...Vcr,)j((BAy)VuoV...Va,) 
Finally, 
4. r 1 (ddbd) : (y v ao v . . . v a,) + ((/? A y) V a,, v . . . v a,) 
5. r t- (ddbdcd) : ((j? A y) v cto V . . . v a,) 
as required. 17 
1, 3, (* E) 
2, 4, (* E) 
Corollary 2.7. There exists a nondeterministic proof formula, and, such that r k and : 
c( if and only if there exists a deterministic proof formula, ad, such that r F ad : CL 
Proof. This is the n = 0 case of Theorem 2.4. 0 
Thanks to Theorem 2.4 and Corollary 2.7, various uses of t- may be interpreted 
with respect o deterministic or nondeterministic proof formulae, as convenient, without 
affecting the meaning of the relation. In addition, nondeterministic proof formulae give 
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a natural meaning to the form r k as,. . . , a,, i.e., there exist a~, . . . , a, such that 
r I- a0 : cQ,...,an : a,. The form r k !P, with collections of propositional formulae on 
each side of the I-, but no proof formulae, is called a sequent. 
2.3. Sequent calculu.9 
The inductive definition of proof formulae in Definition 2.1 provides a very natural 
basis for realizability semantics, but it is not the most convenient for proving com- 
pleteness results. For that purpose, a sequent, or tableau, formulation is more helpful. 
We regard sequent and tableau rules as alternate ways of deriving sequent relations 
of the form r I- Y, as discussed after Corollary 2.7. Except for =+ RW, which is 
an innovation from Kurtz, Mitchell and O’Donnell, the following rules (Table 1) are 
equivalent to the Beth tableau rules [2, 71, but presented in sequent notation [30]. The 
rules are presented schematically about a horizontal ine, with several sequent schemas 
above, and one below. The meaning is that one can derive an instance of the sequent 
below the line from corresponding instances of the sequents above the line. 
Theorem 2.8. If a sequent relation MO,. . , GI, k flo,. . . ,/?,, is derivable by the rules 
in Table 1, then for all labels x0,. . . , ,,, x there exist nondeterministic proof formulae 
bo,..., b, such that x0 : ao,. . .,x,,, : a,,, t bo : /IO,. . . , b, : fi,,. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of derivation. The basis case is straight- 
forward. 
(OR) Assume that the last step in the derivation is an instance of (AR): 
Table 1 
Constructive Sequent Rules 
(B) I-,a k a, Y 
r,a,crv/lt- Y 





(+L) r,D,a * B k Y (+-Rs) 
r,a*pt Y 
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Fix labels x0,. . .,x,,,. By our inductive assumption, there exist nondeterministic proof 
formulae a, b, c, d, eo, . . . , e,, and f 0,. . . , f n such that 
1. X0 : yo,...,xm :y,I_a:a,c:(aAB),eo:60 ,..., en:& 
2. x0 : yl.), . . .) x,:y,t_b:B,d:(aAp),fo:60 ,..., f,,:6,, 
We continue: 
3. x0 : yo,...,xm :~~t(a,b):(aAfl),c:(aAB),d:(aA/?), 
eo : 60 ,..., e, : 6,, fo : 60 ,..., fn : 6, 1, 2, @AI) 
4. x0 : yo,...,xm : Ym k [(a,b,),[c,dll : (a A P>, 
eo : 60 ,..., e, : &,fO : 60 ,..., fn : 6, 3, (nN) twice 
5. x0 : yo, . . ,xm : Ym k [(a,@, [c,dll : (a A PI, 
[e0,f01: ~O,...,[en,fnl: 6, 4, (nN) n times 
The other (OR) rules translate similarly to the corresponding (n@R) rules. 
(OL) Assume that the last step in the derivation was by an instance of (AL): 
Fix labels x0, . . . ,x,, w, y, and z. By our inductive hypothesis, there must exist non- 
deterministic proof formulae do,. . . , d, such that 
k. x0 : yo,. . . ~,:y~,y:a,z:~,~:(aA~)t-d~:6~ ,..., d,:6, 
Now, 
1. v:(aA/?)ko:(aA/?) (W 
2. u : (a A p) k (aou) : a 1, (nAE) 
3. v : (a A B) k (alo) : /? 1, (nAE) 
Lines (2) and (3) enable us to replace occurrences of the label y by (ceu), and z by 
(aru). Let di be the result of such a substitution applied to di. By performing such a 
substitution on the proof formulae in each sequent in the derivation of (k), we convert 
it to a derivation of 
k’. xa : 70,. . .x, : ym, w : (a A p) t db : 60,. . . ,dA : 6, 
by simple syntactic substitution. 
The other (oL) rules translate similarly to the corresponding (n@E) rules. •! 
The proof system of Theorem 2.8 can be modified in several ways that do not affect 
its power. For example, adding the following weakening rule does not increase the 
power of the system: 
rt!P 
WI 
l-,A t Y,O 
Similarly, we can remove (+RW) without decreasing the power of the system. 
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Although the sequent rules above do not mention proofs directly, the construction in 
the proof of Theorem 2.8 shows that the rules provide a different structural form for 
the construction of proof formulae. While the rules of Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.3, 
and the (OR) rules of Theorem 2.8 build up proof formulae by combining one or two 
subproofs with a single new operator at the head, the (@L) rules of Theorem 2.8 build 
up proof formulae by substituting simple subproofs for the variables/labels atthe leaves 
of other proofs. 
Notice that not all proof formulae are generated by the sequent rules. In particular, 
the sequent rules do not generate proof formulae, such as ((h : IX . b)a), in which 
elimination rules are applied to remove operators previously created by introduction 
rules. Such proof formulae are superfluous, in the sense that they may always be 
replaced by more direct proof formulae that never eliminate what they have introduced. 
So, the converse of Theorem 2.8 holds, and every logical consequence derivable by 
proof formulae is also derivable by the sequent rules. This converse is tricky to prove 
directly, but it follows from the completeness proof of Section 10. 
The sequent rules are presented so that, whenever the relations above the line are 
true, so is the one below, but they are more often used backwards in a goal-directed 
search for a derivation. Notice that all of the rules except (B) and (+RS) have the 
property that every formula in the relation below the line appears above the line as 
well. In all but (B) and (+RW), a particular formula below the line is chosen as the 
focus of attention, and its principal subformulae appear above the line. In (+RW), 
only the right-hand subformula ppears above the line. So, when applied backwards in 
the search for a derivation, the rules may be regarded as decomposing formulae about 
their head symbols. It is tempting 
i.e., generalize them to (=%RC) as 
to make (+RS) and (+RW) look like the others, 
follows: 
This generalization embodies the same fallacy as the generalized rule (n + IC) for 
nondeterministic lambda-abstraction proposed after Definition 2.3 The sequent version 
of that fallacious derivation is shown in Fig. 6. So, all theorems of classical proposi- 
tional calculus are derivable using the sequent rules of Theorem 2.8 plus (+ RC). It 
is the retention of Y above the line that causes the problem - the retention of a + /3 
is benign but pointless. The intermediately powerful rule 
(+RCW) 
r,a t a * Po,Bo,...,a * /L/L 




Fig. 6. Constructively fallacious sequent derivation for k a V (a +- 8). 
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is similarly equivalent to the fallacious rule (n + ICW) proposed for nondeterministic 
proof formulae. 
So, it is critical to the soundness of constructive reasoning that, when we assume the 
left-hand side of an implication, we use it only to derive the corresponding right-hand 
side, rather than some other desired formula. This restriction makes each backwards 
application of (+RS) a crucial choice point in the search for a proof. Since no other 
rule discards any formula, we may apply those rules indiscriminately, delaying choices 
until we apply (+RS). Notice that this delaying tactic requires the use of multiple 
formulae on the right-hand side in order to deal with right-hand side disjunctions. 
Otherwise, the simpler form with a single formula on each right-hand side would 
suffice, as in Definition 2.1. 
The closest we can come to (+RC), while maintaining constructive soundness, is to 
include both (+RS) and (+RW). These particular rules, with their redundancy, have 
been chosen to simplify the completeness proof. They allow the maximum possible 
work to be accomplished by indiscriminate backward application of rules other than 
(=$RS), delaying the choice points as much as possible. 
3. Kripke models 
Kripke [ 191 interprets constructive logic as a modal system, in which A and V behave 
classically, but CI + /I has the modal interpretation that in every reachable world 
where 01 holds, /? holds as well. That is, CI constructively implies j if necessarily x 
classically implies /I. The accessibility relation is required to be reflexive and transitive, 
but not necessarily symmetric. In the terminology of modal semantics, these are the 5’4 
models [18]. 
Definition 3.1. Let !I.II = (U,P, R) be a realizability model. Let S be a set of labelled 
assumptions. A valuation of S on U is a function v from the labels of S to evidence 
such that 
x : CI E S implies U(X) E P(a) 
If v is a valuation of S and a E P(a) is a piece of evidence, then [x := a]v is the 
valuation defined as follows: 
[x := a]v(y) = 
V(Y) if Y $x; 
a if y E x. 
Definition 3.2. A Kripke model for positive constructive propositional logic is a triple 
m = (W, 5, v), where W is a set of worlds, 5 is a reflexive, transitive binary relation 
on W called reachability, and v is a function, called satisfaction, from W to valuations 
on atomic propositional symbols, which is closed under reachability, i.e., if D 3 m, 
and if V,(U), then v,(a). 
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Notice that we write vm(a) rather than v(m)(a). 
We extend the satisfaction function from atomic formulae to arbitrary formulae as 
follows: 
Definition 3.3. Let m = (W, 5, v) be a Kripke model. The relation tn 11 CI is defined 
inductively for rn E W and propositional formulae IX as follows: 
l If c( is an atomic propositional symbol, then tn 11 c1 if and only if v,(a); 
l tn 11 a A fl if and only if tn 11 CI and tn 11 /.I; 
l tn IF CI V /? if and only if tn If CI or tn Ik p; 
l tn IF CY + p if and only if for every world D such that m 5 n, and such that n 11 a, 
we also have D 11 j?. 
In addition, we have the following abbreviated forms: 
l YJI bK tl if and only if tn 11 a for every world m in W; 
l bK CI if and only if !LX kx c1 for every Kripke model 1uz; and 
l r +x a if and only if m kk CI whenever 9JI +x y for every y E r. 
l ThK(1)32) = {ct 1 ‘9Jl FK cc}. ThK(W) is called the theory of 1)32. 
Although our results concern only the positive propositional calculus, it may be helpful 
in understanding Kripke models to consider examples of formulae with negation as 
well. The semantic rule for negation is tn 11 -a if and only if there is no n such that 
tn 5 D and D Ik CI. In this treatment, --XX is equivalent to LX + I, where I is false in 
every world of every model. 
The most natural intuitive explanation of a Kripke model is that each world tn 
represents a conceivable state of constructive knowledge, and rn +K GI means that CI is 
knowable in world tu, and tn 5 tn’ means that it is possible to be in state tn at one 
moment, then in state tn’ at some future moment. The closure of v under 3 means that 
knowability of atomic formulae is never lost, and a simple induction shows that kx is 
similarly closed, so no ability to know the truth of a formula is ever lost. Notice that A 
and v behave classically at each world, but c1 + /I asserts that, in all possible futures in 
which c( is knowable, /I is knowable as well. Beth models are similar to Kripke models, 
except that ctV/? may hold in a world tn where neither GI nor B holds, as long as every 
possible future from tn leads eventually to a world where one of a and /I holds. This 
variation has important technical advantages for some semantic studies. In particular, 
the theory (set of true formulae) of each world is no longer a prime set. This, together 
with the inclusion of fallible models, namely those with possibly inconsistent theories 
at some worlds, has opened the way for a constructive treatment of completeness by 
Veldman, de Swart, Friedman and others. See [37] for a discussion. These advantages 
of Beth semantics are not directly relevant to our analysis. We seek more explicit 
semantic representation of the concept of construction within the semantics itself. It 
remains an intriguing question, however, how the fallible Beth approach might be 
captured in Lhchli semantics. A first attempt at a solution is considered in [25]. 
Many interesting examples of Kripke models may be pictured as labelled trees, 
where the nodes denote worlds, the reachability relation is the transitive closure of 
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the directed edges, and the labels describe which atomic propositional symbols hold 
at the associated worlds. To understand Kripke semantics better, consider the Kripke 
models pictured in Figs. 7-10. Each one is the countermodel to one or more interesting 
formulae that are classically, but not constructively, true. 
Without loss of generality in the description of constructive propositional theories, 
Kripke models may be restricted to be finitely branching (or even binary), well-founded 
forests. Every theory of a Kripke model that is disjunctively closed, (i.e., whenever 
cc v /J’ is in the theory either c( or p is in the theory) is the theory of a finitely branching, 
well-founded, rooted tree. Theories that are not disjunctively closed require multiple 
roots with c( true at one root and /? true at another. In Kripke models with a unique 
root (i.e., a minimal element under 5) the root world may be thought of as the present 
time. A formula holds in a uniquely rooted model if and only if it holds at the root. 
The restriction of Kripke models to trees does not affect the valid formulae (a such 
that +k a) nor the valid consequences (pairs (r, r) such that r /=k c1), even though 
it restricts the theories of individual models. 
Notice that branching is essential to Kripke models. Linearly ordered Kripke models 
satisfy lc( V 73, (a a /?) V ((a * p) * a), (x * b) V (p + a), ((r4 * /I) + y) * 
((B + a) + y) + y. The nonlinear model in Fig. 8 falsifies all of these formulae. 
Also, the use of arbitrarily long chains is crucial. For example, Kripke models with 
chains of length at most 1 satisfy r V (u + (p V -/?)), c( V (a =+ (j3 V (p + cc))). The 
model in Fig. 9 uses a chain of length 2 to falsify these formulae. Finally, arbitrarily 
deep nesting of branching is essential. For example, every model with only one level 
of branching satisfies 
7cI v 7-a v (a* (+ v --B)), 
(@ =+ Y) v (Co! =+ Y * Y) v (x =+ ((B * Y) v ((B =+ Y) =+ Y>))). 
But, the model in Fig. 10 uses nested branching to falsify these formulae. 
It is sometimes crucial to distinguish two worlds D and m in a Kripke model, 
even though the same set of atomic formulae holds for each (i.e., {U : v,(a)} = 
{a : v~(cI)}), because the different possible futures may make nonatomic formulae be- 
have differently on the two. For example, the simplest model falsifying (a + p)V((a + 
p) =+ a) is illustrated in Fig. 11. In this model, the same atomic propositional formulae 
are true at u and at tn, but, if the two worlds are identified, the resulting model satisfies 
(a =+ /3) V ((a + /I) + cc. The explanation for this apparent paradox is that in world 
D it is possible to come to know cc, while this is not possible in world m. 
The temporal-epistemic reading of Kripke models is unsatisfying as a foundation 
for constructive logic, since there is no explicit treatment of constructions as objects. 
While Kripke models are very convenient and useful technical tools, particularly for 
demonstrating that certain formulae are not constructive theorems, a proof of complete- 
ness with respect to Kripke models does nor demonstrate fullness of constructive logic, 
because we have no reason to believe that every Kripke model represents a conceiv- 
able constructive reality. It may well be that the fundamental nature of constructions 
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Fig. 7. Kripke counternmdel for a V la, a V (a + p), 1-a + a, ((a * j7) + a) + a. 
. . 
\/ . 
Fig. 8. Kripke countermodel for -a V l-a, (a * B) V ((a * P) * a), (a * 6) V (B * ah 
((a * B) * Y) * ((B * a) * Y) * 7. 
Fig. 9. Kripke countermodel for a V (a =S (b V -/?)), a V (a + (B V (B + a))). 
Fig. 10. Kripke countermodel for la V 1-a V (a 1$ (-j V -3)). (a * y) V ((a * Y) * v)V 
(a * ((B =s y) V ((B * v) * Y)))). 
Fig. 11. A Kripke countermodel for (a 3 8) V ((a + 8) + a). 
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restricts the possible temporal developments of knowledge in a significant way. But, 
the completeness of the Heyting calculus for Kripke semantics depends critically on the 
use of rather complex reachability structures on worlds. A temporal-epistemic reading 
of this ordering seems to serve pedagogical aim at best. It is far from a convincing 
explanation of the alleged constructive nature of this semantics. 
It is not even clear that soundness for Kripke semantics upports faithfulness. The 
absence of an explicit representation of constructions raises doubt whether the mod- 
els contain sufficient information to determine truth and falsehood. For example, sup- 
pose that in every world for which a holds, fl holds as well, but the knowledge 
of that fact is not constructive. Is it reasonable to say that a +- fl holds 
constructively? 
Dummet [4] has written a much more thorough critique of Kripke and Beth models 
as interpretations of constructive logic, and has shown why they do not qualify, in 
his view, as explanations of constructive meaning. The Lauchli realizability models 
that we construct in Section 6 will turn out to correspond in a very simple way to 
certain restricted Kripke models, but not all Kripke models will correspond to Lhchli 
realizability models. So, the proof of completeness with respect o Lauchli models is 
prima facie stronger than completeness with respect o Kripke models, and leads in 
fact to a reasonable demonstration of fullness. 
4. Realizability semantics 
Realizability semantics i  based on the intuition that a formula is constructively valid 
precisely if it is realized by some construction that demonstrates its validity. We as- 
sociate with each propositional formula a class of objects including all conceivable 
pieces of evidence that might be advanced in support of the formula - even some 
objects that do not constitute constructive proof, along with those that do. The distinc- 
tion between constructively valid and invalid evidence seems to be better made as a 
judgement applied a posteriori, rather than as a restriction applied a priori. 
We will consider three different notions of realizability semantics. The first is de- 
fined informally in this section, to correspond as closely as possible to a plausible 
intuition about constructions. The other two are defined formally in subsequent sec- 
tions to approximate the informal concept. In each of the three, the classes of evidence 
are essentially the same - all those objects of appropriate type to support a given for- 
mula. Each semantics identifies a different subclass of evidence for a formula, called 
the realizers, and defines a valid formula as one that has a realizer in every model. 
The three semantics, in spite of their different definitions of realizers, turn out to have 
the same theory. 
The following two definitions, in essence a reformulation of the so-called BHK, 
or Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation [37] of the logical connectives, are 
intended as almost precise intuitive ones, not as formal mathematical definitions. 
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Definition 4.1 (Informal). A realizability structure R is a collection of classes P(a) 
of pieces of evidence for each proposition CI, such that 
l For each atomic formula CI, P(a) contains all conceivable constructive vidence 
for a. 
l P(a A /?) is the class of all pairs containing a member of P(a) marked in some way, 
and a member of P(B), marked in a different and distinguishable way. 
l P(cr V /3) is the class containing each member of P(a) marked in some way, and 
each member of P(p) marked in a different and distinguishable way. 
l P(u =+ fi) is the class of all not necessarily uniform or effective rules of correspon- 
dence mapping P(a) to P(j). 
It is important in Definition 4.1 that P(a) may contain evidence that does not constitute 
constructive proof of M. Although such insufficient evidence will never be taken as 
legitimate proof, it will have an indirect effect because a construction demonstrating 
GC + /3 is a function that must operate on all conceivable vidence for tl, not just that 
evidence that constitutes constructive proof. 
It is tempting to mark each member of P(cr v /I) and components of members of 
P(a A /?) with a token indicating only which of the propositions denoted by a or 
/I is supported, not whether it is on the left or the right of the V or A. When a 
and /I denote the same proposition, the marking could be ambiguous. The difference 
between unambiguous markings based on position in a formula, and possibly ambigu- 
ous ones based only on the proposition represented by a given subformula, does not 
seem to affect any of the results of the semantic analysis in this paper. It would 
be interesting, nonetheless, to see a careful development of the ambiguous-marking 
approach. 
Several plausible restrictions on the classes of evidence allowed in realizability struc- 
tures do not seem to matter, and we have aimed for generality as much as possible. 
For example, our definition does not view evidence as either characterizing, or as be- 
ing characterized by, the proposition for which it is evidence. Thus, a given piece of 
evidence is allowed to support different propositions, so P(a)nP(p) may be nonempty 
although tl and /I are not equivalent. Even the extreme restriction that P(a)nP(fi) = 8 
whenever M: $ B does not affect the propositional theories that can be generated by 
realizability structures. 
As long as the classes P(E) are allowed to have arbitrarily large finite sizes, other 
restrictions on their sizes are irrelevant to the formal propositional theory of constructive 
logic. For example, we may require them to be all nonempty, all finite, or all infinite, 
without losing any potential theories. Thus, our fullness results are valid even if there 
exists potential evidence for every proposition. 
Now, we define satisfaction of a proposition by a realizability structure. This basic 
type of relation is central to our semantic analysis, and it appears in several variations, 
all based on the general form R + a : a. This form asserts that the evidence repre- 
sented by a constitutes a valid construction verifying the proposition represented by 
a, in the conceivable state of the world represented by R. In this paper, propositions 
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are always represented by propositional formulae, but the ways in which each of the 
other two concepts is represented varies, as well as the technical criteria for validity 
of a construction. A construction may be represented variously by a proof formula, 
or by a functional associated with the construction. A conceivable state of the world 
may be represented by a realizability structure, or by any of several types of formal 
model. 
Definition 4.2 (Informal). Let R be a realizability structure, and P(8) one of its 
classes. When a is a uniformly constructible member of P(u), we write R b a : ~1, 
and we say that a realizes a in R. 
In addition, we use the following abbreviated forms: 
l R b CI (read R satis$es x) if and only if there exists an a such that R k a : ct. 
l + a if and only if R k a for every realizability structure R. 
l r + c( if and only if, whenever R satisfies every formula in r, then R also satisfies 
c(. 
There are two sources of informality in Definition 4.2. First is the inherited informality 
from Definition 4.1, where the mechanism for constructing evidence for a composite 
formula from evidence for its subformulae is given by intuitive description. Then, the 
intuitive use of the phrase “uniformly constructible” to restrict the realizer a adds a 
second, and more profound, informality. 
The first informality can be removed by formalizing evidence classes in set theory, 
say in CZF or IZF, or in a sticiently strong constructive type theory. 
Definition 4.3. A realizability model is a triple ‘$3 = (U,P,R) satisfying the following 
conditions. 
0 U is a set. 
l P maps atomic propositional formulae to subsets of U. We extend P to all positive 
propositional formulae inductively as follows: 
- P(a A p) = P(a) x P(B). 
- P(a v P) = (101 x P(a)) u (111 x P(P)). 
- P(a +- /I) = P(pp. 
An element of P(a) is called evidence for K 
l For each formula c(, R (ct) C_ P(u). An element of R (cc) is called a realizer for a. 
l !R /=a a : LY if and only if a E R (a) 
l % bR c( if and only if there exists an a such that % +;R a : o! 
Note that our formalization of realizability models involves several commitments hat 
are not a part of the informal definition of realizability structures. First, the intu- 
itive classes P(A) of objects providing evidence for atomic formulae are modeled as 
subsets of a formal set U. Second, the distinguished pairs of P(A AB) are repre- 
sented by ordered pairs, although no order was required for the distinguishing princi- 
ple in P(A A B). Third, the marked objects of P(A V B) are represented by using the 
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particular marks 0 and 1. Finally, the rules of P(A + B) are represented by deter- 
ministic functions in extension. In each application of realizability models, we must 
inspect he effects of these changes to insure that the formal properties of the models 
reflect the true properties of intuitive realizability structures, rather than artifacts of the 
formal representation techniques. 
Resolving the informality in the reference to “uniformly constructible” elements is 
much more difficult. One reasonable candidate for the class of constructible functions 
is the total computable functions, which is not even recursively enumerable [28]. 
It is not clear which is the right class of functions to use among those having a 
satisfactory effective formal definition. So, instead of attempting a direct and precise 
formal characterization of uniform constructibility, we leave the definition of realizers 
arbitrary, and investigate different classes of models with different realizers. Given a 
model !X , notice how the class of formulae CI such that % +R a in Definition 4.2 
depends on which members of P(a) are accepted as realizers. In the extreme case, 
where every piece of evidence is a realizer, we get classical ogic. 
Definition 4.4. A realizability model ‘93 = (U,P,R) is a classical realizability model 
if and only if R(a) = P(a) for all formulae a. 
r kc o! if and only if % j==~ u for every classical realizability model ‘3 such that 
93 FR y for every y E r. 
In classical realizability models, 0 simulates falsehood, and each nonempty set sim- 
ulates truth. In particular, R (a =s- B) = R (&R(a) = 0 if and only if c1 # 0 and B = 0. 
It is easy to show that r kc CI if and only if a follows from r in classical ogic. 
If we expand the set of allowable realizers, we may satisfy more formulae, and if we 
contract it we may satisfy less. So, variations in the class of acceptable realizers have 
monotonic effects on the relations % +a a and /=R ~1. So, we can study the informal 
concept of uniformly constructible realizers indirectly through formal approximations. 
That is, we find two different approximate criteria for uniform constructibility - a 
necessary but not suliicient one, and a sufficient but not necessary one. These two 
formal definitions of realizability bracket uniform constructibility above and below. But, 
the propositional theories of the two bracketing formalisms turn out to be the same, 
and therefore they are the same as the intuitive and informal theory of constructive 
propositional logic. 
First, we consider the realizers that are defined by formal constructive proof formu- 
lae (the I-realizers), and the relation +A where ‘$3 bl a whenever there is a l-realizer 
in P(a). It will be obvious from the definition that every &realizer is uniformly con- 
structible, and therefore k~ s k. So, a formal proof of soundness for +l supports 
the faithfulness of formal constructive logic. Next, we consider a class of invariant 
realizers proposed by Lauchli [22] and the associated relation +L. Then we argue that 
every uniformly constructible realizer is necessarily an invariant realizer, and there- 
fore k C /=L,. So, a formal proof of completeness for k~ supports the fullness of 
constructive logic. 
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In effect, we establish the chain of implications 
r t- 01 implies r +i a 
implies r b cr 
implies r +L c( 





Implications (5) and (8) are formal theorems (Theorems 5.6 and 10.12, respectively). 
Implications (6) and (7) are informal claims that we justify with detailed intuitive 
arguments (Propositions 5.4 and 6.12, respectively), but which cannot be proven for- 
mally. This strategy lets us show that the formal proof system of Definition 2.1 cap- 
tures precisely the power of constructive reasoning for positive propositional logic, 
in spite of the lack of a precise formal and effective characterization of 
constructions. 
5. Lambda realizability 
In this section, we develop the relation +A, mentioned in Section 4, so as to prove 
the soundness of F with respect to k~. The idea is to show that each proof for- 
mula a : a (cf. Definition 2.1) names a specific piece of evidence in Z’(a), and then 
to let these particular named pieces of evidence be the realizers that determine the 
satisfaction relation +A. This structure makes the justification of implication (6) es- 
pecially transparent since it is intuitively clear that each named piece of evidence is 
constructible. 
Recall the definition of a valuation from a set of labels to evidence from Section 3, 
Definition 3.1. The evidence denoted by a proof formula is defined by: 
Definition 5.1. Let S t- a : a, and let u be a valuation of S. The evidence F”,(a) 
denoted by a with v is defined by induction as follows: 
l if x is a label, then 9,(x) is u(x); 
l F”( (a, b)) is the ordered pair of F”(a) and F”(b); 
l F,(nlu) is b when F”(a) is the ordered pair of b and c; 
l FU(nza) is c when F”(a) is the ordered pair of b and c; 
l ZFU((O,a)) is the ordered pair of 0 and 9,(a); 
l F,((l,a)) is the ordered pair of 1 and F”(a); 
l ,F&abc) is F”(b)(d) when F,(a) is the ordered pair of 0 and d, and PO(c)(e) 
when F”(a) is the ordered pair of 1 and e; 
l B,(ba) is FGv(b)(FO(a)); 
l F-,(kx : a . b) is the function mapping each a E P(a) to F[x:=a]v(b). 
A piece of evidence b is a lambda proof over v if there is a proof formula a such 
that b = F-,(a). 
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When a is a closed proof formula - one with no assumptions - no valuation is 
required, and we write simply 9(a), and call this a closed lambda proof. Lauchli calls 
the pieces of evidence 9(a) definable by closed proof formulae the simple functions. 
A lambda model is just a realizability model, with some specified objects that are 
postulated to be lambda proofs, and therefore realizers. 
Definition 5.2. A lambda model is a triple (U,P,u), where U, P are the first two 
components of a realizability model, and u is a valuation on U. 
Lambda semantics is defined by taking the realizers to be the lambda proofs, so a 
formula M is true precisely when there is a lambda proof in P(a). 
Definition 5.3. If !JJI = (U,P, u) is a lambda model, then %JI +A a : c( if and only 
if a E P(a) is a lambda proof over u. As in Definition 3.3, we have the following 
abbreviated forms: 
l !BI k~ CI if and only if there is an a such that !lJI bl a : a; 
l +A ct if and only if !IJI kn 01 for every lambda model %I$ 
l r k,~ c1 if and only if %II +A c1 whenever !M ki y for every y E r. 
If r +A CC, then a is a lambda consequence of r. 
There is a very strong and reliable intuitive consensus that all lambda-definable ob- 
jects are uniformly constructible. Normalization procedures, and implementations of
fimctional programming languages, are practical demonstrations of this constructibility. 
Because it allows only some of the uniformly constructible objects - the lambda- 
definable ones - to be used as proofs, lambda semantics is at least as stringent as 
intuitive realizability semantics. We are now able to establish implication (6). 
Proposition 5.4. For all formulae a and sets of formulae r, if r +A cz then r + CC. 
Justification. Each lambda proof is defined by a particular proof formula a. We simply 
reinterpret a within an arbitrary realizability structure satisfying all members of r. Each 
assumption may be interpreted as referring to some unknown uniformly constructible 
object in an appropriate class P(a) for some tl E r. The primitive operations creating 
and projecting from pairs are clearly uniformly constructible, as is the conditional 
operation x. The two forms of construction in proofs are application of a Cmction to 
an argument (ba) and explicit definition of a function by a term (ti : 01 . b). Both of 
these forms clearly preserve uniform constructibility. 0 
Proposition 5.4 argues, in effect, that lambda-definability is a sufficient condition for 
uniform constructibility. 
Now, we can show the soundness of provability with respect o lambda-realizability 
semantics (i.e., implication (5)) in a formal theorem. 
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Theorem 5.5. For all labelled formulae a : M. and sets of labelled formulae {xg : ~0,. . , 
xk : yk}, if x0 : yo, . . . , Xk : yk k a : CI, then for all lambda models YJI = (U,P,u) with 
v(x0) E P(Yo), . . . o(Xk) E P(Yk), we have !IJI +I. F”(a) : ct. 
Proof. Straightforward. 0 
Theorem 5.6 (Soundness of I- for +A). Zf r t a, then r FL CC. 
Proof. Assume r 1 CI. Let a be a proof formula such that r t a : ct. Then there exist 
labels x0, . . ., Xk and fOInndae Yo, . . ., yk in r such that 
x0 : yO,...,Xk : yk k a: a 
Let m = (UP, V) be a lambda model such that 1111 k=i Y for all Y E r, and let 
go, . . ., gk be proof formulae such that !IJI kn S,(gi) : yi for each i<k. 
Let a’ be the proof formula obtained by replacing every free occurrence of a label 
xi by the proof formula gi. As usual, renaming of bound labels may be necessary to 
prevent capture of free labels. The free labels that occur in a’ are precisely the free 
labels it inherited from the gi’s. As 9, is defined on the gi’s, the valuation u must 
be defined on the free labels that occur in the gi’s, 8, is defined on a’, and therefore 
‘9-R bi F”(a’) : o! as required. 0 
Along with Proposition 5.4, Theorem 5.6 shows that the conventional systems for 
constructive propositional logic are faithful to the intuitive realizability semantics. No- 
tice that Theorem 5.6 provides not only theorem soundness, i.e., t- CI implies k=n a, 
but in fact provides deductive soundness, i.e., r t- c( implies r by c(. 
The converse of Theorem 5.6, i.e., the completeness of I- for +A, is also true and 
not difficult to prove. We omit the proof here, as it will be a trivial consequence of 
our proof of the completeness of F for k L. Since the converse to Proposition 5.4 
is not intuitively apparent, we cannot infer the fullness of t with respect o k from 
the completeness of t with respect o +A. The technical completeness with respect o 
lambda-realizability semantics is not satisfying, because it begs the question whether 
the lambda-definable functions include sufficiently many constructions. 
In order to prove an intuitively satisfying completeness result, we must choose 
tractable necessary conditions for uniform constructibility. Most work on realizabil- 
ity follows Kleene [ 15-171 in concentrating on the computability of functions, using 
recursive function theory. Rose showed that Kleene’s computability-based realizability 
does not support completeness for the Heyting Calculus - the formula 
((TTY =+ Y) + (“Y v -y)) * (“Y v ‘Y) 
has a Kleene realizer [31], but is not provable in Heyting Calculus. Liiuchli showed [22] 
how completeness follows from uniformity alone, without considering computability. 
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6. Lluchli’s realizability semantics 
Logical demonstrations are linguistic constructions, manipulating the names of 
objects rather than the objects themselves. Since the atomic formulae have no predeter- 
mined logical meanings, the assignment of names to constructions for atomic formulae 
is essentially arbitrary, except that a single name may not be assigned to two different 
objects. The symbols A, V, and +, however, have definite logical meanings, so the 
names for their constructions have logical content, and the assignment of names to 
constructions i derived from the assignments associated with atomic formulae. 
Given the arbitrary nature of the assignment of names to constructions of atomic 
formulae, we would expect that different minds would make different assignments. In- 
deed, a single mind might make different assignments at different imes. This renders 
the task of communicating (or even remembering, which might be viewed as the spe- 
cial case of communicating with oneself) constructions for atomic formulae by purely 
logical methods impossible. For composite formulae, however, there is hope. For ex- 
ample, the term (,7+x : u . x) reliably names a specific construction of a + a. We are 
confident hat we will interpret his term the same way next year as we do today, and 
that when we communicate this term to others, they will interpret it in the same way 
as we do. 
Every constructive proof formula should, like (k : a . x), denote a uniform piece of 
evidence, in the sense that it reliably names a construction independently of the assign- 
ment of names to evidence for atomic formulae. LZiuchli’s insight is that constructive 
proof systems are complete for a semantics (FL) based on uniformity alone. This lets 
us define semantics independent of any specific notation for constructions. 
Two functions ml and m2 (for meaning) from a fixed set of names to a fixed set 
of pieces of evidence are type-consistent if and only if for every name x and formula 
a, ml(x) E P(a) if and only if m&x) E P(a). In a realizability model, we can lift 
ml and m2 to act consistently on names of realizers of arbitrary type. A name x is 
(ml,mz)-uniform if ml(x) = 1122(x). 
Now we need formal necessary conditions for a piece of evidence to be a construc- 
tion, and those necessary conditions will be taken to define the realizers for Liiuchli 
models. In the special case where ml and rn2 are bijections such conditions are simple 
to define. In this case, n = m2 om;‘, is a permutation on the set of evidence. Moreover, 
a name x is (ml,mz)-uniform if and only if ml(x) is invariant under 7~. Thus, we can 
avoid the need to formalize the relation between ames and evidence, and instead ana- 
lyze abstract permutations of the evidence. Our formal definition is based on extending 
this case to handle more than two meanings (thereby giving rise to more permutations). 
Notice that if an object is invariant under two permutations, it is necessarily invariant 
under their compositions and inverses. Therefore, there is no advantage in considering 
arbitrary sets of permutations: it suffices to consider just those sets that form groups. 
Since we only require necessary conditions for a piece of evidence to be a construction, 
we ignore meaning functions that are not bijections (they would lead to more stringent 
conditions), but a thorough analysis of those functions might be interesting. 
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We do not claim that all invariant evidence is constructive, nor do we claim that 
invariance provides an adequate formalization of the notion of uniformity. It suffices for 
our purposes that we can justify the informal claim that every uniform construction is an 
invariant piece of evidence, and that we can prove formally that a formula has invariant 
evidence in every Lauchli model if and only if it is a theorem of the Heyting calculus. 
Definition 6.1. A Liiuchli-model is a triple ‘3X = (U,P, II), where 
0 U is a set. 
l P maps atomic propositional formulae to subsets of U. 
l II is a group of permutations of U, setwise stabilizing P(a) for each atomic 
formula CI. 
A Lhchli model is abelian if the group II is. 
Having defined our models, our next goal is to define what it means for a formula 
to hold in a model. To this end, we lif? the permutations of II from U to P(a) for 
arbitrary formula a. We then define %II +;L a if and only if there is evidence a E P(a) 
that is invariant under (fixed by every element of) II. The invariant pieces of evidence 
are the realizers for Lbchli models. 
Given a permutation 7c and an atomic formula a, we define rc, to be the restriction 
of n to P(a). This is guaranteed to be a permutation by the setwise stabilizing clause 
of Definition 6.1. Assume that we have defined the action of rc E II on P(a) and 
P(p). Clearly, the action of rc on an element of P(a A /?) ought to be to permute the 
components of each distinguished pair independently, according to the action that has 
already been defined on P(a) and P(j). Similarly, the action of K on P(aV /?) ought to 
be to permute each marked member of P(a) according to its action on P(a), leaving 
the mark unchanged, and analogously for marked elements of P(p). 
The permutation z of P(a + fl) must map f E P(a + p) to a new function n,+ f. 
Since f operates from and to unpermuted evidence, and n,+f operates from and to 
permuted evidence, nc,,,f should have the same action on permuted evidence that f 
has on unpermuted evidence (see Fig. 12). From this diagram, it is clear that n,,,rf 
must satisfy nZ+P f a = n8( f (nl’a)), so n.+ f = ng o f o 7-c;‘. We see now that, e.g., 
the identity function on each class P(a) is invariant under all permutations, as well as 
the function in P(a A (a + fl) + /I) that applies the P(a + p) component of its input 
to the P(a) component. 
Definition 6.2. If !IJI = (U, P, II) is a Lauchli model, then we define the permutations 
rc, of P(a) for every rc E II and formula a as follows: 
l If a is an atomic formula, and a E P(a), then x,a = xa; 
l if (a, b) E P(a A fi), then n,,,(a,b) = (n,a,x,b); 
l if (0,a) E P(a V /I), then nlvB(O,a) = (0,qa); 
l if (1, b) E P(a V p), then 7c,,,(l,b) = (l,n,b); 
l if b E P(a + j), then x,+b = qj o b o 7~;‘. 
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Fig. 12. Diagram of the permuted function n,+f. 
Finally, there are several special types of Lhchli models that we consider in the 
sequel. 
Definition 6.3. Let lllz = (U,P, II) be a Lauchli model. 
%JI is jinite if and only if U is finite. 
‘$I is well-ordered if and only if P(a) has a well-ordering for every propositional 
formula CI. 
Notice that the finiteness of U implies the finiteness of P(a) for all ~1, but a well- 
ordering of U does not imply that all P(a)s are well-ordered. 
Definition 6.4. If II is the set of all permutations setwise stabilizing P(x) for each 
atomic formula CI, then (U,P,II) is the full Lauchli model for (U,P). 
Full models are natural sorts of maximally permuted models. Lauchli implicitly uses 
a sort of minimally permuted model, in which all permutations are generated by a 
single n - in this setting he reduces all group-theoretic reasoning to number-theoretic 
reasoning about the lengths of cycles in z 
Definition 6.5. If II is a cyclic group of permutations (i.e. II = {xi ) i 80) for some 
permutation n), then (U,P,II) is a cyclic Lauchli model for (U, P). 
We are now ready to define what it means for a formula to hold in a Lauchli model. 
Definition 6.6. If mZ = (U,P,II) is a Lauchli model and c1 is a formula, then ‘9.JI /=r 
a : a if and only if a E P(a), and rc.(a) = a for every n E II (i.e., a is invariant under 
IV 
Equivalently, we can define a realizability model %I? = (U, P, R ), where R(a) = 
{u E P(m) 1 xn,u = a for all n E II}. Then !lJI by a : a if and only if YJI’ /=a a : a. 
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As usual, we have the following abbreviated forms: 
l ‘$JJ +L ~1 if there exists a E P(a) such that 1)32 /=L a : cc 
l +:L CI if and only if ‘9JJ F.L CI for every Lluchli model mm. 
l r by M if and only if 9J +t, tl whenever !lJI +L y for every y E r. 
l ThL(9Jl) = {x 1 9Jl +L cc}. ThL(‘iUl) is called the theory of %R. 
The hierarchies of permutations {n,} defined by Lauchli models are examples of 
the logic& relations [34] used to study definability in the lambda calculus. Lhchli’s 
results [22] are stated only for full models, but his proofs construct only cyclic models. 
For generality and smoothness of reasoning we decided to cover both extremes, and 
everything in between. 
Clearly, larger groups make for fewer theorems. 
Theorem 6.7. Let 9JI~z1 = (U,P,II,) and YJIz = (U,P,&) he Liiuchli models. Zf 
II, C I&, then ‘9JIz k.L a implies that ‘?JIl +=L a. 
If llJ1 +L x for all full models ‘9JI, then b=L ~1. 
Proof. Trivial. 0 
Now, we argue that Liiuchli semantics is more liberal than intuitive realizability 
semantics - that it allows at least as many inferences. Since this claim is not expressed 
formally, we must appeal to intuition in the argument. In order to illuminate more 
precisely the intuitive assumptions that are required to support our arguments, we 
consider three propositions: first that b c( implies FL CI, then that r k c1 implies 
r ‘FL a for finite sets f, and finally that r k M implies r FL CI for all r. The 
first proposition depends only on basic intuitions about uniformity of constructions, the 
second requires the deduction property for b=, and the third requires compactness. 
Proposition 6.8. For all formulae CC, k CI implies FL a. 
Justification. It suffices to show, for every Lauchli model YJI = (U,Pm, III), that there 
exists a realizability structure R with evidence classes PR(a) such that every uniformly 
constructible object in pn(cI) corresponds to an invariant member of Pm(cr). We have 
already argued that permutation invariance is a necessary condition for uniformity. We 
must now argue that the formal set-theoretic definition of Pm(u) in a Lauchli model 
gives a sufficiently accurate representation of pR(cI) in a corresponding realizability 
structure. 
The basis case where c( is atomic is straightforward, if we accept that every formal 
set corresponds to some intuitive class. &(a~/?) is the set of ordered pairs of elements 
from Pn(or) and P&?). The informal definition of &(a A p) required only that the 
elements of each pair be marked distinguishably, but not necessarily ordered. It is clear 
that the ordering is ignored in Definition 6.6, so the added specificity of ordering, rather 
than distinguishing, has no impact on our results. Similarly, the specific choice of 0 
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and 1 as the marks for the members of Prm(a V p) is not used in Definition 6.6 - any 
other marks would have the same effect. 
Next, we have gone from the functions-as-rules of pR(U 3 B) to the hmctions-in- 
extension of Pm(@ + /I). Notice, however, that we did not require the rules constituting 
evidence in Definition 4.1 to be uniform or effective. So, every extension corresponds 
to at least one rule - the rule that looks each input up in a graph of the extension. 
Certainly, every rule has an extension. Different rules for the same extension might 
be permuted to different extensions, since there is no reason to require any sort of 
uniformity of the permutations themselves. But limiting attention to extensions reduces 
our freedom in choosing a permutation, which can only increase the occurrence of 
invariants and the set of theorems. 0 
Proposition 6.8 above claims that all valid formulae according to a certain construc- 
tive intuition are Liiuchli valid. In order to support a claim that valid inferences are 
confirmed by Lauchli semantics, we need the deduction property to connect inferences 
and theorems. 
Definition 6.9. A logical consequence relation +Q between sets of and formulae 
has the deduction property if and only if, for all formulae a, /I, and for all sets 
of formulae r 
Proposition 6.10. t= - the logical consequence relation of the intuitive realizability 
semantics of Dejinition 4.2 - satisjes the deduction property. 
Discussion. We can find no detailed rigorous argument in support of the deduction 
property for /=. r, a + #I requires only that every structure satisfying r U {a} also sat- 
isfies /I. This is enough to guarantee a uniform construction mapping each realizability 
structure R with uniform constructions for r U {a} to a uniform construction for /3 
in R. But, a uniform construction for a + /I must also map nonconstructive evidence 
a for u to evidence for jI. It is very plausible that such mapping can be achieved 
by considering a modified structure R’, similar to R, but with a corresponding piece 
of evidence a’ arranged to be uniformly constructible. More definite support for the 
constructive validity of this technique requires a deeper analysis of the properties of 
uniform constructions than we have achieved here. Perhaps for some constructivists, 
the deduction property is an article of faith. 0 
Proposition 6.11. For all jinite sets r of formulae, and for all formulae c( 
r + a implies r F:L a 
Justification. Let r = {r,, . . . , m}, and assume r k tl. By Proposition 6.10 applied n 
times, b yi * .. . y,, + a. By Proposition 6.8, FL yi + . . . yn + u. By the validity of 
modus ponens for kr (easy to prove), r FL ~1. 0 
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Proposition 6.12. For all sets r of formulae, and for all formulae CY 
r + a implies r t=~ a 
Justification. Direct from Propositions 6.11. Even if compactness fails to hold, we 
must accept Proposition 6.12 for possibly infinite sets of formulae if we believe that 
the deduction property (Definition 6.9) holds for an extended infinitary or second-order 
language in which, for each (possibly infinite) set r of formulae, there is a formula 
expressing the conjunction of all the formulae in r. 0 
The converses to Propositions 6.86.12 are not intuitively apparent, but will follow 
from a later formal proof that +L is equivalent to +A. 
It is not really crucial to our project of establishing the fullness of constructive 
proofs with respect to intuitive realizability semantics to have soundness with respect 
to Lauchli semantics. But, such a soundness result simplifies life, and is easy to prove 
anyway. 
Theorem 6.13. Let a be a formula, {no : y. , . . . ,Xk : yk) be a set of labelled formulae, 
and a be a proof formula, If { x0 : yo, . , Xk : yk} k a: CC, then for ah Liiuchli models 
llJz = (U, P,rI) and valuations u with 
we have ‘!!A +L F,(a): ~1. 
Proof. Elementary induction on the structure of the closure of a. It is easy to see that 
each of the inductive steps in Definition 5.1 of 9”(a) preserves invariance. 0 
Corollary 6.14 (Soundness of F for +=L). Zf r k CC, then r b=L a. 
Notice that it is absolutely crucial to modeling constructive logic that we require 
invariant functions to map all objects in their domains, not just the invariant ones. 
If we redefine P so that P(a + j?) is the set of invariant functions from P(M) to 
P(p) - that is, we filter out variants as we perform the inductive construction of the 
P(cr)s, rather than globally after the construction - then we get classical logic again. 
Similar considerations hold for the intuitive realizability semantics. So, it is crucial to 
constructive realizability semantics that unacceptable evidence be included in models, 
in the form of not-uniformly-constructible pieces of evidence, which are to be ruled 
out as realizers. That is, the inputs to constructions are treated as black boxes that are 
postulated to be constructions, rather than as explicit constructions in a known system 
of notation. 
The observations above show that, according to realizability semantics, it is not 
proper to read “a constructively implies j3” as “if there is an actual constructive 
realizer for a, then there is also such a realizer for p.” Rather, it means the same 
as “there is a uniform construction which, given arbitrary evidence for a, produces 
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evidence for /I that is constructive relative to the presumed construction of a.” So, 
from our point of view, the implication in constructive logic has a subjunctive, and not 
simply conditional, quality. And, constructive logic is especially conservative, in that 
it demands explicit constructions of conclusions, but does not assume that hypotheses 
are constructed in any particular notation. 
In order to manipulate and analyze Lliuchli models more conveniently, we develop 
alternate characterizations of validity in Lauchli models. In particular, A and V behave 
classically, and the validity of + in one model depends on models whose permutation 
groups are subgroups of the first. 
Theorem 6.15. Let f? be a Ltiuchli model, 
l 2 b=,a/\/?ifandonlyifI? kLaand2 +~j. 
l 2 k=~ a~/3 zfandonly $2 FL a or f? /=L/?. 
Proof. Elementary. 0 
Definition 6.16. Let 2 = (U,P,II) be a Lauchli model, a E P(a) for some proposi- 
tional formula a E PF. 
The orbit of a in a subgroup II’ G II is {n(a) / TC E II’). 
The stabilizer of a in II is stabn(a) = (7~ E II 1 ~~(a) = u}. 
Similarly, if A & U{P(a) 1 a E PF}, then the pointwise stabilizer of A in II is 
stab&) = (7~ E II 1 (Va E PF,a E A f~ P(a))Qa) = u}. 
If A G U{P(a) 1 a E PF}, then the setwise stabilizer of A in II is set-stab&I) = 
{xEE] (Va E PF,u ~AflP(a))n,(a) E AnP(a)}. 
When a above is atomic, we get the conventional definitions of pointwise and setwise 
stabilizers. It is easy to prove by induction on the structure of a that the extended 
concepts are well-defined. 
Theorem 6.17. Let L! = (U, P,II) be a Liiuchli model. Of the three propositions 
below, (1) a (2) H (3). Furthermore, if 2 is well-ordered, then (3) + (I), so all 
three are equivalent. 
1. L! +La=+fl 
2. For all subgroups II’ & II such that (U, P, II’) FL a, (U, P, II’) FL B 
3. For all a E P(a), (U,P,stabn(u)) b=~ p 
Proof. The proof that (1) + (2) H (3) is elementary. 
For (3)+4 l), assume that there is a well-ordering of U{P(a) 1 a E PF}, and that 
(3) holds. We construct a function f E P(a + /I), such that f is invariant under II. 
First, let g be a function from P(a) to P(p) such that for all a E P(a), stabn(u) fixes 
g(u) as well. Such a function is guaranteed by (3). Now, let f(u) = n;‘(g(Qu))), 
where n,(u) is the least element (under the given well-ordering) in the orbit of a (i.e., 
in {n,(a) 1 71 E II}). 
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To see that f is invariant, consider an arbitrary z E II, a E Z’(a). 
~X~,l(f)(~) = ~,‘(f(%(4)) = ~6’(0,‘(s(o~(n~(a))))) 
= (C,i 0 ~,J’(g((~, 0 n,)(a))) = f(a), 
where ((T, on,)(a) is the least element in the orbit of a, which is the same as the orbit 
of 71,(u). q 
Theorem 6.18. Let L! = (U,P,Il) be a Ltiuchli model. Then (1) =S (2) below. 
1. 5z kLo!jlj 
2. l L! /=L a implies L! t==L j?, and 
l for all a such that stabn(u) # II, (U,P,stabn(u)) bL c1+ /3 
If I? is well-ordered, then (1) and (2) are equivalent. 
Proof. (l)+(2) is direct, and the rest is an elementary application of Theorem 
6.17 0 
7. Converting Liiuchli models to Kripke models 
In this section, we show that for every well-ordered Lauchli Model B, there is a 
logically or elementarily equivalent rooted Kripke model 53. First we make this notion 
of equivalence precise: 
Definition 7.1. Let 2I and 23 be models for propositional logic. We say the models 
are elementarily equivalent, and write 2I = 23 if they have the same theories, that is 
to say, if precisely the same set of propositions is true in each. 
To construct a Kripke model from a Lhchli model, we let the subgroups of the 
permutation group be Kripke worlds. 
Definition 7.2. Let (! = (U,P, II) be a Lauchli model. X(L! ) = (W, 5, v), where W 
is the set of all subgroups of lI, i is the subgroup relation, and v,(a) if P(a) contains 
an object invariant under the permutations in ID. 
Lemma 7.3. Zf 2 is a LBuchli model, then X(L! ) is a rooted Kripke model. 
Proof. To prove that they are Kripke models, we need only show that v is closed 
upward under 5, which follows directly from the fact that a point invariant in a 
permutation group is invariant in all of its subgroups. Rootedness is elementary, since 
II is the root. 0 
Theorem 7.4. Let f? = (U, P, II) be a well-ordered Liiuchli model. Then ThL(2 ) = 
ThK(X(2 )). 
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Proof. By induction on the structure of a formula ~1, using Theorems 6.15 and 
6.17, a holds in each Lauchli model (U,P, II’) iff it holds at the world II’ of 
X(2). 0 
8. A technique for constructing Kripke and Liiuchli models 
The essence of a completeness proof is a procedure which, given a candidate sequent 
r k u, r, constructs either a proof of CI from r or a countermodel satisfying r but not 
CC. If the procedure is effective, and always halts, and the properties of the procedure can 
be proved constructively, then we get a constructive proof that every sequent is either 
provable, or false. We can prove such a result for the propositional calculus, because it 
is decidable. For more powerful languages, the procedure is forced to compute infinitely 
when it fails to find a proof, and it constructs an infinite countermodel by a limiting 
process. In such a case, the best we can hope for is a constructive proof that if a 
sequent is true then it is provable, or the even weaker contrapositive if a sequent is 
not provable, then it is false. 
The proof/countermodel procedure above requires a basic model constructor to pro- 
duce countermodels for a sequent r I- CI from countermodels for other sequents that 
arise in the search for a proof. It is easier to understand such a constructor for Kripke 
models, before developing an analogous constructor for Lauchli models. 
Tree-like Kripke models are naturally conceived as constructed using several oper- 
ations: one, stoning that attaches to a given model a new least node below its root, 
another, a joining or gluing operation that combines everal given models above a new 
root. The latter operation can be thought of as the sum of the scones of each model 
followed by identification of root nodes, or as the scone of their sum. The result of 
such operations depends, not only on the models to be combined, but also on the 
settings of atomic formulae at the new root. In order for the operation to make sense, 
the settings at the new root must be consistent with those at the roots of the original 
models. 
Definition 8.1. Let S = (W,d,v), fii = (Wi,5i,vi), and R2 = (Wz,i2,v2) be 
Kripke models, and let r be a set of atomic formulae such that 
for all y E r. We define the r-scone Rr of A to be the model (W“, 1’“, v’), where 
l WO={ra}uWwithr~#W 
l r o 5” m for every world m in IV, and 5” trr~ =3. 
l v;Jy) if and only if y E r, and for every other world tn,v;(a) H v,(a). 
We define the r-join Rl@rSi2 to be the model (W*,~*,V*), where 
l W’ = ({ 1) x WI) u ((2) x W2) u {noo), 
for some t-no 6((l) x W1)U({2} x W2). 
J. Lipton, M.J. O’DonneNIAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 81 (1996) 187-239 223 
Fig. 13. The joined Kripke model R~@sTR~. 
l d* is the least relation satisfying 
- tno 5* It, for all m E W 
_ tz) ii 0 implies (i, tn) i* (i, n) 
l v* is defined by 
_ v&,(a) if and only if a E r 
- vim,(a) if and only if vi,(a) 
Rr@rfi~ is shown pictorially in Fig. 13. 
We will not require a precise characterization of the theory of joined and stoned 
models here. The construction, and its connections with realizability and the slash 
operation are discussed at length in Smorynski’s [33], in [37]. An equivalent operation 
on Heyting algebras was defined by Freyd (who first called it stoning) in the 197Os, 
who extended it to arbitrary categories (see [8]). Freyd’s scone is also discussed and 
applied in [21, 32, 261. 
We will be interested here in the correspondence between joins of Kripke models 
(and of Lauchli models), treated in this section, and the use of joins in the completeness 
proof of Section 10. The following partial characterization is included just to exercise 
the intuition about joins. 
Definition 8.2. A set of formulae r is deductively closed if and only if r k a implies 
that a E r. 
r is disjunctively closed (or prime) if and only if (~1 V j?) E r implies that either 
aerorpcr. 
Observe that ThK(R) is deductively and disjunctively closed, for every rooted Kripke 
model si. 
Theorem 8.3. Let sil and siz be Kripke models satisfying all formulae in II 
. ThK(fiI @r 92)CThc@l)nTh(R2). 
l For each atomic formula a, u E ThK($tI @r R2) if and only if a E r. 
l Thx(fir er 522) is a function of Thx(fir) and Th(S2) and r. 
Proof. Elementary induction on the structure of formulae. 0 
In fact, of those deductively and disjunctively closed sets of formulae that are subsets 
of the intersection of the theories of Kripke models RI and 92, and that contain exactly 
the atomics in r, the theory of the join is a maximal one. 
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Theorem 8.4. Let RI and AZ be Kripke models satisfying all formulae in r. Let Y 
be a deductively and disjunctively closed set of formulae, such that 
ThK(Rl@R2)G YGTt’k(fil)flThK(fi2) and 
{u ( a E Y and a is atomic} = T. 
Then Y = ThK(fii@rJIZ). 
Proof. By elementary induction on the structure of a formula a, if a E Y, then 
It is easy to see that the theory of the join of Kripke models, although it is maximal 
in the class described above, is not maximum. Consider joining two one-world Kripke 
models, each verifying a and /I, but no other atomic formula. Take the @join. The 
theory of the join contains a + p, but not (a + /?) + a. There is another maximal 
deductively and disjunctively closed set containing (a =F p) + a but not a + j3, 
particularly the theory of the ternary 0-join that adds a third one-world Kripke model 
with a true but /? false. 0 
In a completeness proof, the join operation may be used to combine a countermodel 
fii Fk a1 + /?I and a countermodel RZ kx a2 + 82 into a SimUltaneOUS countermodel 
for both implications: fii@rSi2 kk al + a2 and fii@rR2 p:K a1 + a2. 
9. Separating, stoning and gluing 
We now define some useful geometric constructions on Lauchli models. We will use 
the following conventions. 
9.1. Separated group actions 
Let G be an abelian group. We will write H < G to mean H is a subgroup of G, 
and G/H to mean the set of all right cosets of H in G, that is to say, the set 
{gH : g E G), where gH = {gx : x E H}. 
We will write [g]H as alternative notation for gH. Recall that G/H can be viewed as 
the set of equivalence classes of G modulo the equivalence relation 
x~ywx-‘~EH. 
A group action of a group G on a set U is a triple (G, U, cp) where cp is a map 
cp:GxU -+ U 
satisfying rp(e,x) = x and cp(g, cp(h,x)) = q(gh,x), where g,h E G, e is the identity in 
G andxE U. 
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The value cp(g,x) is called the action of g on x and is often written gx when the 
mapping cp is clear from context. Any group action of G on U can be identified with 
a group of permutations of U by identifying each g in G with the permutation x H gx. 
For the rest of this section we will only be considering group actions given by a group 
of permutations on a set, so we will just denote such actions by pairs (G, U) where 
U is a set and G a group of permutations of U. The group of all permutations of a 
set U will be denoted SU. 
Definition 9.1. We say a group action (II, U) is separated if for every subgroup H of 
II there is an element of U fixed by H and its subgroups, but by no other subgroup 
of II. The Lauchli model (U, P,II) is separated if (II, U) is. 
Definition 9.2. Let !2 = (U, P,II) be a Lauchli model. Define, for each atomic 
formula a 
I[al={H<II:Fix(H)nP(a)#@} 
Let X(II) be the subgroup lattice of II ordered by reverse inclusion. A subset of 
X(II) is open if it is upwards closed. Observe that each [a 1 is open. For 6 an open 
set, define SQ(II, 0) = {II/H : H < II and H E 0). When the group II is clear from 
context we will simply write SQ(0). The separated universe of II is lJSQ(II, X(n)). 
The separated closure of II is the group action (IP, USQ(II, .X(II))) with ~([x]~) = 
[~IH~ 
The separated closure Sep(f? ) of the Lauchli model 2 is the Liiuchli model 
(U SQ(II, .X(II)),p, II) where &CC) = lJ SQ(II, I[u 1). 
A group action of the form (II, lJ SQ(0)) just described is sometimes referred to as a 
group acting on its right cosets in the literature. 
Lemma 9.3. Let G and H be subgroups of a group lI acting on its cosets as described 
above. Then some member of II/G is jixed by every member of H if and only if H -C 
G. Thus, if 0 is an open set of subgroups of II and H < II then every member of 
H fixes a member of U SQ(II, 0) if and only if H E 0. 
Proof. Suppose h([x]G) = [x]~. Then [hx]o = [x]o, whence h E G. If every h E H 
fixes [x]~ then H < G. By definition of open, if every such h fixes some [x]o in 
lJ SQ(II, 0) for some G E 0 then H E 0. 0 
An easy consequence of this fact is the following lemma, which asserts that every 
Lhchli model has a separated equivalent. 
Lemma 9.4. rf L! is abelian, then Sep(f! ) is separated, and Th(Sep(l! )) = Th(!2 ). 
Proof. Let !2 = (U, P, II). By Theorem 7.4 the theories of Sep( f? ) and I! are the same 
as those of their associated Kripke models X(Sep(f? )) and X(2 ). The underlying 
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partial order (subgroup lattices) of the two models are the same, so it s&ices to show 
that the same atomic formulas are true at the same corresponding worlds, i.e. that for 
each subgroup H of II the intersection of H with P(a) is nonempty just when its 
intersection with ?(a) is. But this is true by definition of &a). 0 
In this section, we make repeated use of the equivalence of a L%uchli model L) with 
its associated Kripke model X(f? ), established in Theorem 7.4. 
As shall be seen shortly, the group action yielded by separated closure of the group 
of a model is of greater interest han the separated closure of L! itself. Using the 
separated universe U @(II, X(n)) we can exert quite a bit of control on the structure 
of the resulting Lhchli model by selectively picking out the subgroups H whose 
quotients II/H we wish to place in P(E). 
9.2. Stoning Liiuchli models 
In this section we will define a Lbchli model analogue of the stoning and glu- 
ing operations defined for Kripke models above. In particular, given Lauchli mod- 
els f? i, L! 2 and an atomic subtheory r of Th(i! 1) n Th(!i! 2) we will define mod- 
els 2 r and 5? i@r 22 elementarily equivalent o the Kripke models X(L! )r and 
X(f? 1) $r X(L! z), respectively. For the remainder of this section it will be convenient 
to describe the atomic assignment of a Kripke model fi = (K, <, v) as a function 2k 
from nodes to sets of atomic formulas, instead of as a predicate v as in former sections. 
That is to say, we will write ‘?l~(r.n) = S for some set of formulas S as another way 
of saying vm(cr) H c1 E S. 
Definition 9.5. Let sii = (Ki, < I,&), RZ = (K2, <2,2Iz) be Kripke models. A logo- 
morphism between Ri and A2 is a binary relation % on IV, x Wz (the worlds of the 
models) s.t. 
1. ?R covers Ki and K2 (it relates every member of K1 to something in K2 and vice 
versa) 
2. If rni!Rtn2, then the atomic formulae forced by ml are precisely the same as those 
forced by 1~2. 
3. If the theory of ml in K1 is consistent, i.e. not the set PF of all propositions, 
then, if miXm2 and ml < 1 ID{ there is a corresponding xnk S. t. XD~,%D~ and ~2 < 2 tt$ 
and conversely for consistent worlds 1~2 in K2. 
We will say two Kripke models are logomorphic if there is a logomorphism between 
them. 2 
z A logomorphism R induces a bijection between the up-ideal (AlexandroRJ topologies of the two models, 
associating with each open U c 4, the set {z E K2 13, E Kl xR.z } c K2, and conversely. This in turn 
induces an open geometric morphism between the corresponding presheaf topoi, as the categorically minded 
reader can check. Lemma 9.6 follows readily. 
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Lemma 9.6. Let 521,532 be Kripke models, and let ?JI be a logomorphism between 
them. Then, whenever IDI%IQ, UII and 1~2 force precisely the same formulae. A 
fortiori, K1 and K2 are elementarily equivalent. 
Proof. By induction on formula structure. 
Basis: it holds for the atomics by definition of logomorphism. 
Induction: the only interesting case is implication. Suppose a + j is forced at tut 
in 521, where m&Rtnz and tn2 < tni. If x is forced at tni, then there is a tn{ with 
ml < tn{ and tn{%n$. By the induction hypothesis, u is forced at tn{. Since x + /3 
is forced at ml, p is forced at ml,. By the induction hypothesis again /I is forced 
at tni. 0 
Now we define the scone and join of Lhchli models. 
The scone of a Lhchli model is achieved first by lifting and then slightly modifying 
the atomic assignments of the separated closure of the result. 
Definition 9.7. Let 2 = U,P, II be a Lauchli model. The lifted model (! * = (U*,P*,II*) 
is given by the following data: 
1. u* = {O,l} x u. 
2. P*(M) = {O,l} x P(cr) 
3. lI* = (CT, n), that is to say, the subgroup of SC,* ) generated by o and u = {is : 
71 E II}, where 
0 o(i,x) = (1 - i,x) for i = 0,l. 
l C(i,x) = (i, 7c.x). 
The group in the lifted model is the result of augmenting the original group by a 
single permutation CJ of order 2 which guarantees that no P(a) has a global fixed point 
(that is to say a point fixed by every permutation in II*). C-J commutes with all En, so all 
elements of the augmented group are of the form ail or just E, for some rt in II. If II 
is abelian, so is II*. Notice that the subgroup lattice of the augmented group consists 
of two planes, a lower one consisting of a-groups: subgroups containing elements of 
the form ail and an upper one consisting of subgroups of the embedded copy h of 
II. Now we transform this into the structure we are seeking by taking the separated 
closure as underlying group action, but carefully redefining atomic assignments so as 
to produce a model whose associated Kripke model is equivalent to X(f! ) in the sense 
of Lemma 9.6. 
Definition 9.8. Let L! = (U, P,II), be a Lhchli model, r an atomic subtheory of 
Th(f!)), and Q* = (U*,P*, II*) the lifted model. For each atomic proposition cx we 
have, as before, 
[a 1 = {H < II : Fix(H) n P(a) # @} 
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and we define its image [a ] to be the set of corresponding subgroups p in n, and 
its *-image [cr]* to be the set of subgroups 
{H<II*:Hf~~~[[crllandHfIT*}. 
That is to say, [a I]’ consists of all proper subgroups of II* whose image under the map 
XHXflrr 
lies in (the copy in n of) the original [cr]. 
The r-scone !Srof 2 is the model (USQ(X(II*)),P,, II*) with group action the 
separated closure of IL* and where 
P,(a) = 
USe(Uall*) if a @ r, 
u ,sQ(x(II*)) otherwise. 
Theorem 9.9. Let L! = (U, P, II) be an abelian Ltiuchli model, X(9 ) its associated 
Kripke model. Then the scones of each are elementarily equivalent, i.e. 
ThL(er) E ThK(X-(52 )r). 
Proof. We show that there is a logomorphism between X(2 r, and X(2 )r satisfying 
the premiss of Lemma 9.6. Let K1 be the underlying partial order of X(er), namely 
the lattice of subgroups of II*, and K2 the underlying partial order of X( 2 )r). 
Observe that K1 is the union of the poset {H < (~,n) : cr E H}, of o-groups and 
the lattice of o-free groups Xx(). Thus every subgroup W in KI is of the form 77 or 
(cr,H) for some H E X(f?). 
Also observe that Kz is the union {r 0) U X(II) (see Definition 7.2). 
Now Define the relation ??? on K1 x K2 by 
!lI = {(R,H) : H < II} u {((o,H),H) : H < II and H # II} U {((a,n),r~)} 
By the preceding remarks !R covers K1 x K2. By the definition of the atomic assignment 
P for the P-scone, R-related worlds have the same atomic assignment. The reader can 
check that the third condition of Definition 9.5 is also satisfied. Thus, by Lemma 9.6, 
%-related nodes have the same theory, and the two models are elementarily equivalent. 
0 
9.3. Gluing 
Definition 9.10. Let 2 1 = (U,, PI, III) and I! 2 = (U2, P2, II,) be Liiuchli models, and 
Ut @ U2 their disjoint union {l} x U, U (2) x U2. We then define the following groups 
of permutations of U, 6B U2 
l ni = {ii : TC E Iii} where 71(&x) = (i, nx) and ii(2 - i,x) = (2 - i,x) if it E ni (i = 
L2) -- 
. IIt& = {Et 0 712 : ill ELI and jt2 E&} 
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-- 
Define a subgroup W of IIiIIz to be pure if W < !Ii for i = 1 or 2. Call a subgroup 
W clean if W is of the form niH with H < n2 or Hn2 with H < El, and unclean 
otherwise. 
We are now ready to define the r-join (or gluing of f? 1 and 9 2 along r). The 
notation is from the preceding definition. 
Definition 9.11. Let 2 1 and !Gz be two Liiuchli models and let r be an atomic sub- 
theory of ThL(!i?l) nTh,(f?2). Let f!f = (Ui,Pi,IIt) and f?; = (Uz,Pz,IIz) be the 
r-scones, respectively, of the two models. For each propositional letter CI let 
_- -- 
where 
[a 1; = {H < Iii : Fix(H) n Pi(a) # @a) 
and let 
_- 
T = { W < IIll& : W unclean} 
Then &? 1 @r II? 2 = (6, p, fi) where -- 
1. E = Um(.xm~2)), -- 
2. II = (II,&) and 
3. i;(X) = uSQ( EmI* u T). -- 
In particular, (6,fi) is the separated closure of II*&. 
Observe that since the constituent models 5?i of the join were already stoned, the 
atomic theory of the join will be r. 
Lemma 9.12. Let L! 1, !2z,fi and 2 ,@r 22 be as in the preceding defmition, with 
2 ~,i! 2 abelian, and with H < II, G < II2 and ‘r the poset of unclean subgroups of 
II*. Then -- -- 
1. Th(H II,) = Th(H) and Th(IIlG) = Th(G). 
2. For W E T,Th( W) = PF, the set of all propositions. 
3. Fix@) n&a) # fa ti ct E r. 
Proof. Easy and left to the reader. 0 
We now come to the main result of the section. 
Theorem 9.13. Let L! 1 and 2 2 be well-ordered abelian Liiuchli models, and r be an 
atomic subtheory of both models. Then 
~l@r~z=~(~l)@rm~2) 
that is to say, the theory of their join over T is the same as that of the Kripke-join 
of their corresponding Kripke models. 
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Fig. 14. The Kripke model X(f! ~)@rX(ez). 
Proof. Suppose L!i = (Vi,Qi,di), L! z = (Vz, Q2, AZ), and that the corresponding 
stoned models are 2 F = (Ui,Pi, IIi) and 5Z p = (Uz, P2, IIp), where the Iii are gener- 
ated by the di and a permutation of order 2, as in Definitions 9.7 and 9.8. 
Observe that the embedded submodels X(r! 1) and X(f? 2) of the join Z(f! 1) @r 
X(2 2) have root nodes di and 42 and top nodes ti corresponding to the trivial 
subgroups of the permutation groups Ai, as in Fig. 14. 
We now construct a logomorphism ZR between X(f? i@r f? 2) and the Kripke join 
X(!G i) $r X(L32). Using the terminology from Definition 9.11, we put 
-- 
8 = {(fi,tn,)} U {(HI12,H) : H < A,} u {(I-IlH,H) : H < 42) UT x {t,,tz} 
-- 
Now observe that every subgroup in X(f? 1 @I- f! 2) is either in T or of the form H II2 
-- 
for H < Al or II, H for some H < AZ. Thus, by Lemma 9.12, ?R is a logomorphism. 
Hence, 
10. Completeness with respect o Liiuchli semantics 
The key result about Liiuchli models is the completeness of the standard formal 
systems of constructive proof. Liiuchli proved completeness for the first-order predicate 
calculus [22], but his proof takes an unnecessary digression through Kripke models and 
number theory, and obscures the constructive content of the result. We would like to 
see a proof of completeness that constructs a formal constructive proof directly from an 
arbitrary invariant function of appropriate type, but more study of the structure of all 
invariants of a given type seems to be required for such a construction. Instead, we take 
Fitting’s proof of completeness with respect to Kripke semantics [7], and adapt it to 
an explicit direct construction of Lauchli models. We try to clear up some confusing 
ambiguities in Fitting’s presentation along the way, and we use the redundant rule 
(+RW) to simplify the termination criterion for his procedure, in particular avoiding 
the need for loop detection. 
Before proceeding, we remark that we can obtain completeless immediately just from 
the closure of Lauchli semantics under stoning and gluing, and the fact that, e.g., the 
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Jaskowsky sequence of Kripke models, definable from one-world models just by use of 
the scone and join, is complete for the Heyting calculus. The Jaskowsky sequence, as 
well as the relevance of scone-and-join closure for completeness of a class of models, 
is discussed at length in Smorynski’s [33]. 
The basic idea behind Fitting’s proof is the same as that behind proofs of com- 
pleteness for the classical propositional calculus - define a procedure using rules of 
inference to transform sequents into forms where they are either directly derivable, or 
directly refutable by a countermodel. 
Definition 10.1. A Lauchli model !IJI is a countermodel for a sequent r k Y if and 
only if 9.JI F=L CY for every tl E r and !JJI FL /I for every /? E Y. 
In the case of constructive sequents, directly derivable means that the basis rule (B) 
of Theorem 2.8 applies, in which case we say that the sequent is closed. 
Definition 10.2. A sequent r t Y is closed if and only if r n Y # 0, it is open 
otherwise. 
In order to refute a sequent r /- Y by a countermodel, we must generate enough 
information to know how to treat the atomic formulae, in order to make formulae in r 
true and those in Y false. As with classical logic, it is easy to do so when a sequent 
is saturated in such a way that every nonatomic formula is supported by one or both 
of its principal subformulae. For constructive logic, the (+RS) rule complicates the 
analysis, because in the process of following rules backward from a desired conclusion 
toward saturated sequents, this rule throws away formulae from the right-hand side of 
the sequent, potentially cancelling progress toward saturation. Applications of (=+RS) 
are choice points, in the sense that we must choose the correct implication to process 
in the right-hand side of a sequent, in order to arrive at a proof or a set of satu- 
rated sequents. Because of this complication, Fitting considers semisaturated sequents, 
resulting from all possible backward applications of the choice-free rules, and the as- 
sociated results of single backwards applications of (+RS) to semisaturated sets as 
well. Our addition of the redundant rule (+RW) simplifies the analysis considerably, 
by tightening the correspondence between semisaturation and the results of applying 
all choiceless rules. 
Definition 10.3. A sequent r E Y is semisaturated if and only if, for all formulae CY 
and /J 
1. crABErimpliesaErandPET; 
2. c1 A /I E Y implies c1 E Y or p E Y; 
3. a v p c r implies 01 E r or /I E r; 
4. c( v /I E Y implies CI E Y and p E Y; 
5. a * /3 E r implies cx E Y or /3 E r; 
6. CI + p E Y implies p E Y. 
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A sequent r t Y is saturated if and only if it is semisaturated and, in addition, 
7. CI =+ B E Y implies c1 E r. 
Definition 10.4. A sequent r’ F Y’ is a semisaturation of r I- Y if and only if 
r G r’, Y & Y’, r’ !- Y’ is semisaturated, and for all P and Y” with r C P c P 
and Y C Ylf s Y’ such that Y” F Y” is semisaturated, Pr = P and Yy” = Y’. 
That is, a semisaturation is a (not usually unique) minimal extension of a sequent o 
semisaturated form. 
Definition 10.5. Let r F a + fi, Y be semisaturated, with a 6 r. Then r, a F p is an 
associate of r t- a * /3, Y. 
The final goal of our sequent ransforming procedure is a saturated sequent, which 
must be either closed and derivable, or open and retitable by a countermodel. The 
countermodel for an open saturated sequent is an especially simple tiuchli model with 
trivial subgroup structure, corresponding to a one-world Kripke model, or equivalently 
to a classical model. 
Lemma 10.6. Zf r !- Y is closed, then it is derivable. 
Proof. Trivial from the basis rule (B) of Theorem 2.8. 0 
Lemma 10.7. Zf r F Y is saturated and open, then there is a countermodel 9.I for 
r k Y. 
Proof. Let U = {0,1,2}, P(a) = {0,1,2) f or all atomic formulae a E r, P(a) = 
{ 1,2} for all atomic formulae a $2 r, and let n(O) = 0, n(1) = 2, n(2) = 1. Let 
!IJI = PJ, P, {nn, e)). BY an elementary induction on the structure of y, using saturation 
at each step, y E r implies W +I_ y, and y E Y implies llJz FL y. 0 
Given a sequent r F Y that is not semisaturated, we must consider all possible ways 
of semisaturating it, i.e., all possible ways of applying the sequent rules other than 
(+RS) to obtain it. If all semisaturations are derivable, then we get a proof of r 1 Y; 
if any one of them has a countermodel it serves as a countermodel for r F Y as well. 
Lemma 10.8. Zf all semisaturations of r I- Y are derivable, then r t- Y is derivable. 
Proof. The semisaturations of r F Y are precisely the results of backwards derivation 
from r F Y using all of the rules of Theorem 2.8 except (+RS). 0 
Lemma 10.9. Zf P k Y’ is a semisaturation of r k Y, and ‘3X is a countermodel 
for P k Y’, then !JJI is a countermodel for r k Y. 
Proof. Direct, since r c r’ and Y G Y’. Cl 
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Given a semisaturated but not saturated sequent r k Y, we must consider all of its 
associates. In this case, if some associate is derivable, we get a proof of r k Y, but 
if all associates have countermodels, we can combine them into a countermodel for 
rk Y. 
Lemma 10.10. If some associate of r t- Y is derivable, then r k Y is derivable. 
Proof. Direct, by the (+RS) rule. •1 
Lemma 10.11. Zf r t !P is open and semisaturated, and if every associate r’ k Y’ 
has a jinite countermodel, then r I- Y has a jinite countermodel. 
Proof. Let Yy0 = (~(1 * pi,. . . , a, +- Pn} = {M * /? E YI c1 $ r) The associates 
of r I- Y are precisely the sequents r, ct t fl, where c( + /I E Y~o. Let Tat = {y E 
r 1 y is atomic} 
Let !IJIi be a finite counter-model for r, CQ t pi. Let ‘?IJI = @rat9Xi,. . . , am, (see 
Definition 9.11). By theorem 9.13 and induction on the structure of a formula y, y E r 
implies !IJI F=L y, and y E Y implies 9X p~ y. 
Basis: If y is an atomic element of r, then %JI FL y by definition of 9JX. If y is 
an atomic element of Y, then y $! r by the openness of r k Y, and so 9JI FL y by 
definition. 
Induction: The cases (VL), (VR), (AL), and (AR) follow by arguments similar to 
Lemma 10.7. The two interesting cases are (+L) and (+R). 
(+L) Let y E u + /I E r. Now, either GI E Y or /3 E r by semisaturation. 
If CY E Y, then 2X i+r_ a by our inductive hypothesis. Furthermore, each !lXi +r_ a + 
/I, and so !IJI by CI + /3 by Theorem 6.18. If /I E r, then 9JI FL /3 by our inductive 
hypothesis, and so ‘9X +L a + /I trivially. 
(+R) Let y = a =+ /I E Y. We have /I E Y by semisaturation. If a E r, then 
9JI kL CI and 9JI ‘+L /I, so 9JI &cIL c( + /I. If 01 $! r, then CI is ai and p is fii for some 
CQ =+ pi E Y~o. By definition of fmi, 9JIi 1~ a + /I, SO by the properties of the join 
(Theorem 9.13), ‘%I k~ a =S fi. 0 
We are now in a position to establish the Completeness Theorem: 
Theorem 10.12 (Completeness Theorem). For all finite sets of propositional formulae 
r, Y with Y # 0, either r t Y or there is a jinite Liiuchli model lm such that rXn b=L tl 
for all a E r and llJz p~ j? for all fl E Y. 
Proof. Let C be the set of all subformulae of formulae in r U Y. Our proof is by 
induction on IC - r\. 
Basis: If IC - rl = 0, then r = C, and so Y S r. Therefore r t Y is closed, and 
by Lemma 10.6, derivable. 
Induction: There are three possibilities, according to whether r k Y is saturated, 
not saturated but semisaturated, or not semisaturated. 
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r t Y is saturated. By Lemmas 10.6 and 10.7, P t- Y is either closed and derivable, 
or open and has a counter-model. 
r t- Y is semisaturated, but not saturated. Consider its associates, 
l-0 t Yo,.. .,r, t Y,. 
There are only finitely many such associates (since Y is finite), and there is at least one 
(since r I- Y is not saturated). We have TC T; for each i (in fact, lril = jr/ + l), 
because each associate adds precisely one new formula to the left-hand side of a 
sequent. 
The set Ci of subformulae of Ti U Yi is a subset of C, and we have IZi - ril < 
(Z - rl, and the inductive hypothesis applies to each Ti F Yi. If some Ti E Yi is 
derivable, then by Lemma 10.10, r t Y is derivable. If no Ti F Yi is derivable, then 
by our inductive hypothesis there is a finite counter-model to each Ti I- Yi, and so by 
Lemma 10.11 there is a finite countermodel to r I- Y. 
r i- Y is not semisaturated. If r t Y is not semisaturated, let r, t- Ya, . . ., 
T,,, t Y,,, be its (finitely many, but at least one) semisaturations. r G Ti, and Ci 5 C, 
where Ci is the set of subformulae of formulae in Ti U Yi. So, one of the previous 
cases applies to each sequent Ti l- y/i. Now, either all of the sequents Ti F Yi are 
derivable, in which case by Lemma 10.8, r F Y is derivable; or some Ti I- Yi is 
refutable, in which case Lemma 10.9 yields a countermodel for r F Y, as desired. 
0 
In effect the proof of the completeness theorem provides a procedure that takes as 
input a finite sequent r I- Y, and builds a tree of attempted derivations of r F Y. 
The search for a derivation works backwards, by taking sequents from which r F Y 
has been derived, and adding to the beginning of a derivation more saturated sequents 
from which the later ones may be derived. In some cases, the search succeeds, by 
reducing all sequents to closed form, producing a formal derivation of r l- Y, which, 
by Theorem 2.8 may be converted to a proof formula a such that r F a : J/ for 
some tj E Y. When the search fails to find a derivation, it reduces all hypothetical 
sequents to open saturated form. It is trivial, by Lemma 10.7 to provide countermodels 
for these open saturated sequents, and Lemmas 10.9 and 10.11 show how to construct 
a countermodel to r F Y from the countermodels of the open saturated sequents, and 
the structure of the search for a derivation. In the process we have shown that validity 
for the Heyting calculus is decidable. 3 
11. Negation 
Most conventional treatments of the propositional calculus, whether classical or con- 
structive, include the unary propositional operator negation, which we write as 1. 
3 A well-known result. In fact, Statman has shown validity is PSPACE-complete, see e.g. [27, 7, 371. 
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Technically, it is not particularly hard to provide realizability semantics for conven- 
tional constructive negation, using Liiuchli models. The results look rather peculiar 
intuitively, however, and we do not consider them to be a satisfactory explanation of 
negation. 
Realizability semantics for negation seem clearest when presented through the reduc- 
tion of negation to implication and falsehood. We introduce a special atomic propo- 
sitional symbol _L to denote falsehood, in the sense of absurdity, inconsistency, or 
contradiction. Then, let la be an abbreviation for a + 1. Now, we need only ex- 
tend each Lauchli model ‘3.X = (U, P,ll) to include the new propositional symbol, by 
providing values for P(I). 
The obvious candidate for P(I) is the empty set, since we never intend to consider 
alleged constructions of inconsistent falsehoods. It is not even clear what it should mean 
for something to constitute evidence for falsehood. But, P(I) = 0 does not yield the 
conventional theory of negation formalized in the Heyting Calculus. Notice that the 
empty interpretation of falsehood implies that, whenever P(a) # 0, then P(-a) = 0, 
since there can be no function from a nonempty set to an empty one. Since there is a 
unique function from 0 to any other set, that function cannot be permuted to anything 
else, and so is invariant. So, ‘!JJI t=~ la if and only if P(a) = 0. When P(a) # 0, then 
P(7a) = 0, so 9.X 1;~ -a. Thus, we cannot construct a model with empty interpreta- 
tion of falsehood that simultaneously invalidates la and TTa, nor one that invalidates 
(la) V (7-a). 
A technically correct solution is to allow each model to set P(I) arbitrarily, as long 
as there is an invariant function from P(I) to P(a) for each atomic formula a. It is easy 
to see, by induction on formula structure, that this property must hold for nonatomics 
as well. This solution seems no better than a thinly disguised introduction of I + a 
as an axiom schema, and we do not find any useful semantic intuition about falsehood 
there. A variant that is not quite so transparent an encoding of the axiom schema above 
is to require that P(I) G P(a) for each atomic formula a, so that the required invariant 
function is simply a restricted identity function. While the latter solution does not beg 
the question of why falsehood should imply everything so transparently as the former, 
it does not appear to answer the question either. Since the containment of P(I) as a 
subset does not pull up inductively to evidence for nonatomic formulae (the presence 
of an invariant function does, but on nonatomic domains the function is no longer a 
restricted identity), this solution makes a counterintuitive distinction between atomic 
formulae and nonatomics. 
We do not know of an intuitively satisfying semantic treatment of conventional 
negation in the Heyting Calculus. We suspect that the formal treatment of negation in 
the Heyting Calculus is, in fact, not well-founded on the sort of constructive intuition 
that is captured by Lhchli semantics. We hope to see investigation of other notions 
of negation with better intuitive explanations. 
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12. Realizability semantics and completeness for the predicate calculus 
All of the realizability concepts discussed here for the propositional calculus extend 
in well-known ways to the predicate calculus. Liiuchli’s proof of completeness [22] 
is, in fact, for the predicate calculus. Rather than present in detail the definitions and 
theorems appropriate to realizability semantics for the predicate calculus, we merely 
sketch the ways in which the constructive quality of the completeness proof deteri- 
orates. First, validity for the predicate calculus is not decidable, so there is no hope 
of proving that either r k Y or there is a countermodel ‘9JI with 9JI F;L f and 
%I k~ Y. The best approximation that we can hope for is that r +L Y implies 
r k Y (completeness) and the converse (soundness). The weaker implicative form is 
just as good as the stronger disjunctive form as a justification of the appropriateness 
of a formal calculus to a semantic analysis, so this is not a serious problem to the 
intuition. 
Now, consider the procedure that searches for a derivation of r k Y, and produces 
a countermodel when it fails to find a derivation. In the propositional calculus, that 
procedure always terminates, and produces either a derivation or a jinite countermodel. 
In the predicate calculus, the procedure may succeed, or fail after a finite time, or it 
may fail by searching infinitely. In the second case, there is no derivation, and we 
may extract from the trace of the procedure an infinite model. It is not difficult to 
make the definition of this infinite model perfectly constructive, but the proof that the 
model satisfies r but not Y is not constructive. The problem arises in the attempt o 
generalize the proof of Lemma 10.11, in which we joined together the countermod- 
els for all the associates of a sequent r k Y to get a countermodel for r t Y. In 
order to guarantee that the joined model satisfies an implication (a + /?) E r, we 
appealed to Lemma 6.18 and thence to Lemma 6.17 to construct an invariant func- 
tion f in P(cr + p) from a function g in the same domain mapping each member 
of P(a) to a member of P(p) that is at least as stable under permutation. In the 
construction of f, Lemma 6.17 must pick a canonical element from each orbit in 
P(a), since the value of f on a determines the value of S on everything in the orbit 
of a. Such a choice of canonical element was justified in the propositional calculus 
proof, because all models constructed were finite, and therefore well-ordered. When 
joining infinite models, as we do in the model construction for an underivable se- 
quent in the predicate calculus, there is no apparent way to choose the canonical orbit 
elements. 
So, Lhchli’s proof of completeness for the predicate calculus, and all variations that 
we know currently, use the axiom of choice, which is repugnant to a constructive in- 
tuition. We expect hat there is a variation of the technical definition of Liiuchli model 
that allows a constructive proof of completeness-such an improvement is roughly 
analogous to the fallible Kripke, and fallible Beth-style approaches of Veldman, Fried- 
man, de Swart and others (see e.g. [37, 36, 24, 231). Our reason for optimism is that 
the objects in Lhchli models are consciously intended to include more than the truly 
constructible objects. Therefore, it should be possible to replace the proper constructive 
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concept of function used in the definition of P(or + /?) by some sort of protofunctional 
concept, satisfying an axiom of choice. A constructive Liiuchli-style semantics based 
on a relational interpretation of P(a + /3) is sketched in [25]. For any new proposal 
along these lines, it will be necessary to re-examine the intuitive argument that formal 
realizability semantics i  more liberal than intuitive semantics under the new definition 
of P(U), of course. 
13. Categorical models 
There has been important work by Makkai and Harnik in recent years to clarify 
the deeper mathematical structure of Liiuchli semantics via a categorical analysis [ 1 O- 
121. Blute and Scott have developed a categorical Lguchli semantics (and a strong 
completeness theorem) for Linear Logic [3]. 
We defer a categorical treatment of the constructions described above to a subsequent 
paper, as our main points here do not require it. However a few comparative remarks 
are in order. In [lo] the Lguchli completeness theorem is strengthened to the following, 
(where connectionally closed means Cartesian closed with binary coproducts). 
Theorem 13.1 (Makkai-Harnik). Let @ be a countable free connectionally closed cat- 
egory. For each pair of objects A,B of @ there is a representation FA,J : C - Set” 
which is weakly full with respect to A,B, i.e., if @(A,B) = 0 then Set”(FA,FB) = 0. 
In case @ has the disjunction property, the authors exhibit a weakly full representation 
from C into Set”. 
There are a number of significant differences between our treatment and theirs. Given 
a pair A,B where A is a set of premisses (or a conjunction thereof) and B a formula, 
Kripke countermodels KA,B are built via tableaux from the pair A,B. We then build 
a Lhchli model L(K,Q) over a group GA,B whose structure is determined by A,B, 
via gluing and stoning, the map L commuting with these operations on both kinds of 
models. This operation induces a representation F,Q from the proof-theoretic ategory 
(the free connectionally closed category) @ into SetG@. 
A fundamental gain in formulating Liiuchli completeness in terms of a more general 
class of groups, instead of the single group Z is to expose the algebraic structure 
implicit in Ltiuchli’s coding of Kripke structure into Z. We also show the canonical 
role played by the modular groups used in this coding: they provide separated group 
actions that permit gluing of Lsuchli models. 
Nonetheless, a full clarification of the role played by gluing as an operator on Kripke 
and Liiuchli models would seem to require a categorical treatment of more components 
of the structure of the completeness argument. Our constructions eem to suggest hat 
the proper place for formalizing the “Liiuchli representation theorem” along the lines 
developed in this paper is some subcategory of the category of topoi Set’, with varying 
G. These questions will be taken up in a sequel to this paper. 
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